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HEALTH WARNING 
This thesis has been assessed as of satisfactory standard for the award of a 
Master of Science degree in Aircraft Design. Readers must be aware that the 
work contained is not necessarily 100% correct, and caution shall be exercised if 
the thesis or the data it contains is being used for future work. If in doubt, please 
refer to the supervisors named in the thesis, or the Department of Aerospace 
Engineering. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis contains the Group Design Project (GDP) work and Individual 
Research Project (IRP) work. 
 
The target of this GDP was to design a long range flying wing passenger aircraft 
to meet the increasing global aircraft demand. The name of this flying wing 
aircraft is FW-11. This is a project cooperated between Aviation Industry 
Corporation of China (AVIC) and Cranfield University. The writer was involved in 
the conceptual design stage of this project. The author was in charge of the 
engine market, engine selection, engine sizing and performance.  
 
The target of the IRP is to build a set of health management methods including 
system real-time monitoring, accurate fault diagnosis and prognosis of major 
components which are suitable for the aircraft landing gear extension and 
retraction control system. These technologies have the capability to improve 
mission reliability of the aircraft and the maintenance costs could be reduced. 
Simultaneously, aircraft landing gear extension and retraction control system, as 
one of the most important aircraft systems on-board, could directly affect the 
flight safety. Consequently, diagnostic, prognostic and health management 
(DPHM) technology is necessary for the system. 
 
Based on the FHA, FMEA and FTA of the aircraft landing gear extension and 
retraction control system, each of the catastrophic events, all the root causes 
and their effects were identified. Synchronously, all the components which are 
related to the catastrophic events were found. The rule-based expert system 
diagnostic technology was chosen from the available approaches and it was 
successfully applied on the system. Appropriate prognosis approach was 
recommended for each component of the system according to the features of 
components of the system. Finally, the DPHM architecture of the landing gear 
extension and retraction control system was built. 
iii 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter is separated into three parts, the background of GDP and IRP will be 
introduced firstly, and then the aims and objectives will be presented in the following 
part and finally the methodology will be given. 
1.1  Background of GDP 
FW-11 is a project cooperated between Aviation Industry Corporation of China 
(AVIC) and Cranfield University. This group design project is a new conceptual 
design and the target of it is to develop a flying wing commercial airliner.FW-11, a 
200-seat airliner which the range is 7500 nm, mainly focuses on Asia-Pacific region 
market. As a part of AVIC MSc program, the FW-11 project is constructed by three 
phases: conceptual design phase, preliminary design phase, and detail design 
phase. The author was involved in the conceptual design phase which was divided 
into three steps: derivation of requirements, design a conventional aircraft as 
baseline aircraft and design FW-11 comparing with the baseline aircraft. 
The major responsibility of the author is the engine market, engine selection, engine 
sizing and performance. The detailed work will be presented in the Appendix A. 
1.2  Background of IRP 
1.2.1  DPHM Definition 
The competition between airlines is becoming fiercely increased, as a result, high 
efficiency commercial aircraft is always considered to fulfill this demand. From the 
operator’s point of view, the reduction of operational cost plays a very important role 
of aircraft efficiency. Consequently, novel technologies need to be taken into 
account. In response, diagnostics, prognostics and health management (DPHM) 
was introduced into aircraft industry recently. International space station and space 
shuttles applied this new technology for years [1], as well as the Joint Strike Fighter 
which introduces not only a comprehensive and integrated diagnostics system, but 
also prognostics, and an information system including decision support tools for the 
 2
users. [2] 
Diagnostics is to determine the state of components to perform their functions 
according to acquired and detected parameters; prognostic is predictive diagnostics 
including the determination of the remaining time to failure of components. Health 
management has the capability to provide suitable decisions in order to instruct 
maintenance actions according to diagnostics and prognostics technology and 
operational demand. [3]  
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
1.3.1 Objectives of GDP 
In the conceptual design stage of FW-11, the main target of the author in the GDP 
work was the engine market, engine selection, engine sizing and performance.  
The following objectives will be achieved: 
? Research and report on the current engine market and its development in terms 
of technology 
? Employ an appropriate method to estimate the dimensions of the engine 
? Utilize TURBOMATCH to calculate the performance of the candidate engine 
1.3.2 Objectives of IRP 
The main target of this individual research project is to build a set of health 
management methods which are suitable for the aircraft landing gear 
extension/retraction control system.  
The following objectives will be achieved: 
? Research and report on diagnostic and prognostics health management history 
and trends 
? Research and report on the currently available diagnostic and prognostics 
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techniques 
? Use a typical landing gear extension and retraction control system as a case 
study in order to apply the methodology of DPHM  
? Research and report on how can DPHM effect the system maintenance and 
reduce the cost 
1.4  Methodology 
1.4.1 Methodology of GDP Work 
According to the development procedure of the FW-11 was that a conventional 
configuration was developed firstly for comparison, and then the flying wing 
configuration was considered, the design flow of is presented as below: 
1) The current engine market and its development in terms of technology was 
analyzed. 
2) For the conventional configuration, an existing engine was chosen from the 
engine market as a baseline engine.  
3) A new concept engine was considered based on the market analysis and 
development, and then sized with available method according to the aircraft 
parameters and was built to calculate the performance of the engine. Consequently, 
the performance of the conventional configuration aircraft could be compared with 
these two types of engines. 
4) For the flying wing configuration, sizing the new concept engine which is the 
same type as the conventional configuration aircraft use the same method and build 
a TURBOMATCH model to acquire the performance of the engine. 
5) Finally, these engine parameters were provided to the performance team and 
mass & CG team so that the performance of the conventional configuration and the 
flying wing configuration could be compared. 
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1.4.2 Methodology of IRP Work 
The design flow is shown as follows: 
First of all, the landing gear extension/retraction control system of AIRBUS A330 
was chosen as a case study. 
Secondly, in order to apply the diagnostic and prognostic approaches, the key 
parameters and major components need to be identified and monitored. Then the 
functional hazards assessment (FHA), failure modesaand effect analysis (FMEA) 
and faultatree analysis (FTA) would be performed to verify the failure modes and 
critical component. 
Thirdly, based on the result of the system safety and failure analysis, the writer will 
utilize appropriate diagnostic methods and prognostic approaches respectively. 
Then, have a case study according to the chosen diagnostic methods and 
prognostic approaches.  
Finally, the writer will build the architecture of DPHM for the system. 
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2. Literature Review  
2.1  DPHM Development and Functions 
2.1.1 DPHM Evolution 
From the 1950s to the 2000s, the evolutionary process of the aircraft system health 
management technologies which were developed in the Department of Defense 
(DoD) and NASA and is listed in Table2-1. 
Table 2-1 Health Management Technologies Evolution [5] 
 
Early-generation aircraft, in order to meet their health management requirement, 
relied on manual detection of failures and only schematic and voltmeter readings 
were available for maintainers. Over the 1950s and 1960s, as aircraft systems got 
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more and more complicated and integrated, in order to notice the operators and 
maintainers of safety-critical situations, BIT was employed, which led the 
implementation of built-in test equipment (BITE), simple alarms and trending 
analysis. Line-replaceable unit (LRU) which is small light-emitting diode (LED) could 
indicate a fault when it is detected. This capability could reduce the ground-support 
equipments which were used to test critical components. However, the reliability of 
BITE was poor, and it was difficult to use and often confusing. The system 
operators and maintainers still did not fully use this ability and often depended on 
the voltmeter and schematics. [4] 
In the 1970s, as the break through of computer technology, more and more 
computers were introduced into complex aircraft systems. These computers called 
digital BITE have the capability to display different fault by using numeric codes 
which could identify each type of fault and isolate them as well. This approach was 
implemented on many aircraft, such as the B757/767, A300/310, etc. [4] 
In 1986, as the next phase, the ARINC 604 was defined, providing a central fault 
display system (CFDS) which indicate all the systems status on the airplane with 
one display. This approach is capable of accessing maintenance data more 
consistently to across all systems and replacing the system LRUs on the front-panel 
displays. Many of the systems on the B737, the A320 and the MD11 applied this 
technology. [4] 
In the early 1990s, as aircraft systems still became more integrated and complex, 
the ARINC 624 was developed to troubleshoot a problem which a single fault may 
cause many fault indications for other systems. This provided a more integrated 
maintenance system which could reduce more ground-support equipment and also 
consolidate multiple systems fault indication. For instance, the Boeing 747-400 and 
777 airplanes introduced this approach. [6]  
An example of the current technical status of aircraft DPHM is the Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF) program which has extensive DPHM utilizing sensors, advanced 
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reasoning and processing, and an integrated information management system. The 
JSF PHM system on-board is divided into areas such as mission systems and 
propulsion system. [7] 
2.1.2 DPHM Functions 
As Modern PHM systems become very and complex, the main functions are shown 
in the figure below. 
 
Figure 2-1 DPHM Main Functions [8] 
To be more accurate, a DPHM system has many types of functions including fault 
detection, fault isolation, remaining useful life estimation , component life usage 
scouting, false-alarm reduction, health status reporting, only notifies the operator 
what is required to be known immediately, informs the right maintenance 
information to the right people at the right time, etc. “Through the philosophy and 
concept of health management, the modern PHM system uses these functional 
capabilities to complement each other and provide a much larger impact and a 
broader set of maintenance-oriented benefits than any single function by itself.”[4] 
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Figure 2-2 Failure Progression Timeline [4] 
As it is shown in the figure above, there are three stages of fault, first of all, very 
early stage of fault, secondly, system, component or sub-component failure and 
finally, secondary damage and catastrophic failure. It is obviously that the earlier 
detection of the state changes the more benefit we could get. Diagnostic technology 
has been applied between the two stages which are more critical. Prognostic 
technology has the capability to make a prediction of the remaining time to failure of 
systems or components. In order to achieve that and predict it accurately, many 
tools such as advanced sensors and incipient fault detection techniques are 
required.  
2.2  Diagnostics Techniques 
Diagnosis, which has been investigated over the past decades, detects fault 
isolates faulty component and decides on the potential impact of a failed component 
on the system. [4] The prerequisite of diagnosis is to obtain available and sufficient 
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data from a monitoring system. 
 
Figure 2-3 General Diagnosis process [9] 
The figure 2-3 illustrates that a diagnosis process could be described in three parts: 
observation, comparison and diagnosis. Through observation, sufficient data could 
be acquired by implementing diverse sensors measuring physical characteristics 
such as voltage, current, and temperature. During the second step, the acquired 
data will be processed, then make a comparison of the processed output and the 
expected state. Finally, if the result of the comparison indicates the system or 
component working in an eccentrical way, then the cause of the fault should be 
diagnosed. 
The following parts represent the selection of diagnostics approaches available. 
2.2.1 Rule-basedaExpert Systems 
Rule-based expert reasoning system is an artificial intelligence approach using 
"if-then-else" rule. The reasoning engine utilizes these “rules” and search for modes 
in the rules matching modes in the data. The "if" means "when the action or 
performance is true," the meaning of "then" is "take action A" and the "else" 
indicates "when the performance is not true take action B. [3] 
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There are mainly two reasoning methods could be applied to generate the result of 
diagnostics. If the starting point is hypothesized, evidence which support the 
hypothesis can be collected and verified by using a backward-chaining algorithm. 
After the evidence is proved, then the hypothesis could be regarded as the 
diagnostic result. Figure 2-4 illustrates a forward chaining, and the process 
examines rules to verify which one match the acquired evidence. [9] 
 
Figure 2-4 Approach of forward-chaining expert system [9] 
2.2.2 Case-basedaReasoning Systems 
A Case-basedaReasoning System is a technique using past problems to solve 
current problems. In addition, a case-based reasoning system has the capability to 
have possible adaptation of a past solution to fit similar situations by utilizing a 
learning component. A case-basedareasoning system has a case library which 
describes the problem, solutions, outcomes, methods and their efficacy assessment. 
This technique is very suitable for poorly understood problems which structured 
data are available to describe operating conditions. [9] 
There are mainly four phases included in the case-based reasoning architecture 
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which are shown in the figure below. The first one is retrieval which could get the 
best past cases from the case library. Secondly, the differences between the past 
and current case will be found, then, the old solution would be modified in order to 
conform the new problem and a new proposed solution will be conducted. 
The third step is to revise the proposed solution if it fails, then learn how to avoid 
that and repair the solution. Finally, the new solution will be incorporated in to the 
case library. [9] 
 
Figure 2-5 Case-based Reasoning Systems Architecture [9] 
2.2.3 Learning Systems 
Learning systems belongs to data-drivenaapproaches which are developed from 
system operating data directly which might be power, calibration, temperature, 
vibration, oil debris, pressure, voltages or currents. Typically, learning system 
approach is divided into five parts that will be introduced below. First of all, 
high-impact malfunctions need to be determined according to historical data, 
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understanding of the nature of potential faults, their locations, their severity level 
and the characteristic symptoms. Secondly, data selection, transformation, 
de-noising and preparation will be performed to build the final data base for model 
building and classification. After that, trends, degradation and assess the severity 
level of a fault for early stage warning should be detected by implementing data 
processing techniques. The forth step is testing and validation of models ensuring 
the quality and robustness the data of models. The last step is fusion which has the 
capability to estimate fault severity level and to evaluate the health status of a 
system to improve the diagnostic accuracy. [9] 
2.2.4 Model-based Reasoning 
The model based approach compares the system actual performance and the 
model expectation performance. If there is a difference between the actual and the 
expected values, then a discrepancy must be analyzed in order to determine the 
reason for it. [3] Model-based reasoning is the foundation of the diagnosis 
knowledge and techniques, which characterizes the widely use of variety of 
engineering models. [9] In parallel developments, with the implementation of 
powerful processors, input-output transfer function models, analytic state-based 
models, physics-based models, fault growth models and quantitative have been 
found to develop diagnostic software for dynamic systems between different 
communities. [10] One of the fundamental advantages of model-based techniques 
is that the model running with the same inputs as the actual engine will only predict 
the nominal outputs. [11] The figure below shows a typical example of a 
model-basedareasoning system. 
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Figure 2-6 Model-based Reasoning System [9] 
Table 2-2 Comparisons of Diagnostic Technologies [12] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Prognostics 
The target of the prognosis element is to determine a validated estimation of the 
remaining time to failure of a component or system generated by the diagnosis 
technology. [7] 
The figure 2-7 illustrates a fault progression. If a fault is detected when the severity 
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is at 4%, only the component is required to be replaced. If the severity is increased 
to 10%, the subsystem is needed to be replaced. More serious is all the system 
required to be replaced, when the failure occurs. Consequently, it is essential to 
predict fault severity accurately. [4] 
 
Figure 2-7 Fault propagation [4] 
A system could benefit from applying prognostic techniques and the advantages 
are listed below [15]: 
1. Maintenance actions could be scheduled according to advanced warnings of 
failures. 
2. Because of maintenance cycles could be extended if the developed method is 
proven and validated, the availability of a system will increase. 
3. Life-cycle costs of equipments would be lower by reduce inspection costs, 
downtime and inventory. 
After noticing the advantages of prognostic techniques, the challenges should be 
identified. In order to prognoses accurately, the fault propagation models and 
sufficient statistical fault data which could assist in establishing prognostic 
algorithms are required. In the following parts, four challenges of the prognosis 
technologies will be introduced. [4] 
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Challenge 1: Normally, the dimension of a fault might not be detected directly; as a 
result, some measurable parameters which could indicate the fault dimension are 
required.  
Challenge 2: How can it predict the fault progression accurately? A prognosis 
system might have the capability to settle this problem after an appropriate 
algorithm; available sensor metrical parameters and models of a system are 
utilized. 
Challenge 3: How can we determine the prediction confidence limits? In this case, 
probabilistic or other methods could characterize the uncertainty distribution when 
time is progressing.  
Challenge 4: How can we make the prediction more accurate, confident, and 
precise after the initial uncertainty bounds and the fault progression have been 
predicted? It is suggested that a learning strategy which could provide corrections 
according to the actual fault propagation and reliable algorithms of prognosis may 
be required. 
Figure 2-8 summarizes the range of prognosis approaches applied to different 
systems, and shows the relative cost as well. 
George Vachtsevanos, 2006, suggested that there are three approaches could be 
utilized, which are model-basedaprognosis approaches, probability-based prognosis 
approaches and data-drivenaprediction approaches. [4] These approaches will be 
introduced below respectively. 
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Figure 2-8 Approaches of Prognostic Technology [13] 
2.3.1 Model-basedaPrognosis Techniques 
Model-basedaprognostic schemes mainly include four method which are 
autoregressive moving-average (ARMA) techniques, physics-based models, 
empirical-based methods and Kalman/particle filtering, these methods could utilize 
a dynamic model of the process predicted, which provide a extensive approach 
which has been used to comprehend progressions of failure modes of components. 
[4] Figure 2-9 shows a schematic of physics-model based approach. 
Model-based approaches to prognosis can make RUL estimated without any 
measurable event; however, the model usually could be calibrated according to the 
related diagnostic information which is present. Consequently, a combination of the 
model-based and feature-based approaches could fully provide prognostic 
capability over the whole time to failure of the component. [4] 
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Figure 2-9 Physics-modelaBased Approach [13] 
2.3.2 Probability-basedaPrognosis Techniques 
It is very effective to use probabilistic methods of prognosis when previous failures 
could be provided by historical data. Compared with model-based techniques, less 
detailed data and information is required. The reason is that the information 
required for prognosis comes from various probability density functions (PDFs), 
instead of coming from dynamic differential equations. There are advantages 
provided by these methods which the sufficient PDFs could be acquired from 
statistical data and confidence limits of the result could be given in order to have 
accurate and precise predictions. [4] Generally, probability-based prognosis 
techniques include three approaches which are Weibull Distribution model, 
Bayesian Probability Theory and Probability Density Function of Remaining Useful 
Life. 
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Figure 2-10 An Example ofaProbability-basedaApproach [14] 
2.3.3 Data-drivenaPrediction Techniques 
In many cases, it is impractical to conduct a physics-based model for prediction 
when various historical fault data lead to the failure. Nonlinear network 
approximators could be used, which use well established formal algorithms so that 
desired outputs would be provided directly. The neural network is included in 
nonlinear networks; signals could be processed by using techniques in fuzzy logic 
systems and biological nervous systems, which are based on human linguistic and 
reasoning abilities. [14] 
In this approach, operational data which are related to health status of a system is 
gathered. This technique is suitable for the situation when the system performance 
characteristics need to be fully defined to permit complicated models to be 
developed. There are mainly two advantages could be provided by this approach. 
The first one is that it can be developed quickly, and secondly, it is cheaper than the 
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modelabased approach. However, the main disadvantage of this approach is 
thatasubstantial data are required in order to have the mature analysis. [16] 
 
Figure 2-11 Data-Driven Model Based Approach [14] 
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3 Landing Gear Extension/Retraction Control System 
Safety and Failure Analysis 
The main functions of an aircraft landing gear extension/retraction control system 
are to operate the main landing gear, nose landing gear and their doors open or 
close when an aircraft is taking off and landing, at the same time the position of the 
gears and doors could be indicated on the central instrument panel and shown to 
pilots.  
In order to meet the research objectives, the landing gear extension/retraction 
control system of AIRBUS A330 was chosen and introduced firstly. All the other 
research works were depended on this system. After implementing the FHA, FMEA 
and FTA, the critical component and main parameters of the system were 
determined and further research could be carried on based on the analysis. 
3.1 Introduction of Landing Gear Extension/ Retraction Control 
System 
The A330 is a wide-body twin aisle aircraft which is the most efficient one in 
operation today, it could be presented in form of numbers such as over1,100 firmed 
orders, 120 customers and operators, more than 780 aircraft in service, over 17 
million flight hours and over 4 million flights. [27] 
According to the A330 flight crew operating manual, this aircraft has not currently 
equipped the advanced DPHM system. However, probably it will be still in service in 
the next 20~30 years or even longer, consequently, it is possible that the advanced 
PHM technology will be implemented on the A330 to increase the competitive 
capabilities. 
The landing gear extension/ retraction control system has three main functions, the 
first one is normal operation function which controlled by the landing gear lever 
located on the center instrument panel, secondly, the indication function that the 
position of gears and doors are shown on the center instrument panel, finally, the  
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Figure 3-1 Schematic of A330 landing gear extension and retraction control system [26] 
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gravity extension function which controlled by two selectors on the center 
instrument panel. [26] The system architecture was introduced based on the three 
functions respectively. 
As it was mentioned above, the normal operation function is controlled by the lever, 
and gears and doors are electrically controlled by two landing gear control and 
interface units (LGCIU), the two LGCIU will switch over automatically after a 
complete extraction/retraction cycle or a failure is detected. All the gears and doors 
are powered by the green hydraulic system. A safety valve is controlled by two 
signals which are lever position and aircraft speed. The valve will be open if the 
lever is at down position and the aircraft speed is lower than 280 knots. [26] 
The normal operation architecture is given in figure 3-1 below. 
The landing gear position indication and warning function is another important 
function. The gears and doors position could be indicated by landing gear indicator 
panel and the ECAM wheel page. The landing gear position indication is still 
provided by LGCIU1 even when the LGCIU2 is controlling the cycle. According to 
the hazard class of a failure, warnings and cautions will be performed in many 
modes such as aural warning, master light, local warning and etc, when a fault is 
detected. [26] The normal operation architecture is given in figure 3-2 below. 
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Figure 3-2 Normal operation architecture [26] 
Finally, the gravity extension system, when the normal operation failed, permits the 
nose landing gear and main landing gear extension. When the electrical selector is 
set to down position, gears and doors are electrically unlocked, and then, main 
landing gear and nose landing gear could be extended by gravity, after that, gears 
and doors could be down locked. All the doors remain open after gears are 
extended. The indication function is still available for gravity extension. [26] 
The components of this system are presented in the table 3-1 below. 
 25
 
Figure 3-3 Landing gear indication and warning architecture [26] 
Table 3-1 Bill of Material 
Item Components Item Components 
1 L/G Lever 5 Gear selector valve 
2 LGCIU1 6 Proximity sensors 
3 LGCIU2 7 Gravity extension switch 
4 Door selector valve 8 Gravity extension motor 
The author was only considered the components of landing gear extension and 
retraction control system, all the other components such as connectors, wire, 
hydraulic valves, and structural components were not considered. 
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Figure 3-4 Gravity extension [26] 
3.2 System Functional Hazard Analysis 
The following paragraphs present a Functional HazardaAssessment (FHA) for the 
system. The purpose of this part is to perform a systematic and comprehensive 
examination of the function of the landing gear extension/retraction control system, 
and to identify all catastrophic, hazardous, major and minor failure conditions. 
The FHA is also a starting point of the FMEA and related to other analyses, which 
provide the data on fault symptoms of the system. The FHA is constructed 
according to SAE ARP 4761. [25] 
3.2.1 Failure Condition Severity and Effect Classifications 
The severity of failure modes should be classified in order to measure the potential 
effect caused by failures. The following table represents the failure condition 
severity and its effect classifications. [8] 
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Table 3-2 Failure Condition Severity and Effect Classifications [25] 
Failure Severity Level Failure Effect 
Catastrophic 
All failure conditions preventing continued safe flight and 
landing 
Hazardous 
- A large reduction in safety margins or functional 
capabilities; 
- Physical distress or higher workload such that the flight 
crew cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks 
accurately or completely; 
- Adverse effects upon occupants. 
Major 
- Significant reduction in safety margins or functional 
capabilities; 
- Significant increase in crew workload or in conditions 
impairing crew efficiency; 
- Some discomfort to occupants. 
Minor 
Failure conditions which would reduce airplane safety 
margin slightly; increase the crew workload and cause 
some inconvenience to occupants. 
3.2.2 Summary of Landing Gear Extension/Retraction Control System 
FHA 
The detailed results of FHA were shown in the Appendix B. The failure conditions 
related to catastrophic and hazardous events were pointed out and presented in the 
following table 3-10, because the flight safety would be influenced.  
Table 3-3 Summary of system FHA 
Failure conditions Severity Level 
Loss of nose landing gear extension Catastrophic 
Lose of left main landing gear extension Catastrophic 
Lose of right main landingagear extension Catastrophic 
Loss of nose landingagear doors extension Catastrophic 
Loss of left main landingagear doors extension Catastrophic 
Loss of right main landinga gear doors extension Catastrophic 
Erroneous nose landing gear extension position 
indication without warning 
Catastrophic 
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Table 3-3 Summary of system FHA(cont.) 
Erroneous left main landing gear extension position 
indication without warning 
Catastrophic 
Erroneous right main landing gear extension position 
indication without warning 
Catastrophic 
3.3 Failure Modes, Effectsaand Criticality Analysis 
Failureamodes,effectsaand Criticality analysis (FMECA) is a bottom up approach 
that all possible failures should be outlined and the effect of each failure would be 
determined, and then each failure could be ranked based on the category of 
criticality. Normally, the procedure is performed in two steps: the failureamode and 
effect analysis (FMEA), the CriticalityaAnalysis (CA): [28] 
1) The failure mode andaeffect analysisa(FMEA) 
It is utilized to examine the failure modes on the system to verify the results of 
failures and to classify the severity level of each potential failure. [8] 
2) The Criticality Analysis (CA) 
Based on the FMEA, every failure mode would be ranked based on the influence of 
severity level. [8] The criticality analysis was not performed in this thesis. 
3.3.1 Summary of Landing Gear Extension/Retraction Control System 
FMEA 
When FMEA is performed it should be considered that there is only one failure in 
the whole system. The detailed results of FMEA were shown in the Appendix C. 
3.4 Fault TreeaAnalysis (FTA) 
3.4.1 Introduction  
The following parts introduce the FTA of the landing gear extension/retraction 
control system. A FTA is to set one undesired event as a top event and then utilize 
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a method to identify all the root causes of it. The research of FTA is based on the 
result of the FHA and FMEA developed above. The main functions of FTA are listed 
below: [25]  
a) A comprehensive fault tree analysis represents each failure event that could lead 
to the undesired event. 
b) Assess the system safety while it has been modified. 
c) Calculate the probability of a top event. 
d) Allocate the probability of lower level events. 
e) Assess the effects of single and multiple faults. 
f) Assess the redundant design attributes (fault tolerant). 
3.4.2 Symbols of FTA  
A fault tree is consisted of two types of symbols, logic and event. The used logic 
symbols and event symbols are explained in the table 3-4. [25] 
Table 3-4 Symbols of FTA 
Symbols Name Definition 
 Description 
Box 
Description of an output of a logic symbol or of 
an event 
 Undeveloped 
event 
An event has negligible impact on top event or 
details of further event are not readily available 
 Basic event Event which requires no further development 
 OR-gate 
Boolean logic gate - event can occur if any one 
or more of the lower conditions are true 
 AND-gate 
Boolean logic gate - event can occur when all 
the lower conditions are true 
The detailed results of FTA were shown in the Appendix D. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
According to the results of FHA, FMEA and FTA, each of the catastrophic events of 
the landing gear extension/retraction control system and all the root causes and 
their effects were identified. Synchronously, all the components which are related to 
the catastrophic events are listed in the table below. Consequently, the crucial 
components of the system could be identified and the key parameters of the 
components could be acquired. 
Table 3-5 Results of FHA, FMEA and FTA of the System 
Failure condition 
Loss of nose landing gear extension 
Severity Related component Failure detect 
method 
Parameters 
Catastrophic L/G lever, 
Gear selector valve 
LGCIU1,LGCIU2, 
Gravity extension 
switch, Unlock motors 
LGCIU1,LGCIU2 Electrical power 
signal 
 
Failure condition 
Loss of left main landing gear extension 
Severity Related component Failure detect 
method 
Parameters 
Catastrophic L/G lever, 
Gear selector valve 
LGCIU1,LGCIU2, 
Gravity extension 
switch, Unlock motors 
LGCIU1,LGCIU2 Electrical power 
signal 
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Table 3-5 Results of FHA, FMEA and FTA of the System(cont.) 
Failure condition 
Loss of right main landing gear extension 
Severity Related component Failure detect 
method 
Parameters 
Catastrophic L/G lever, 
Gear selector valve 
LGCIU1,LGCIU2, 
Gravity extension 
switch, Unlock motors 
LGCIU1,LGCIU2 Electrical power 
signal 
 
Failure condition 
Loss of nose landing gear doors extension 
Severity Related component Failure detect 
method 
Parameters 
Catastrophic L/G lever, 
Door selector valve 
LGCIU1,LGCIU2, 
Gravity extension 
switch, Unlock motors 
LGCIU1,LGCIU2 Electrical power 
signal 
 
Failure condition 
Loss of left main landing gear doors extension 
Severity Related component Failure detect 
method 
Parameters 
Catastrophic L/G lever, 
Door selector valve 
LGCIU1,LGCIU2, 
Gravity extension 
switch, Unlock motors 
LGCIU1,LGCIU2 Electrical power 
signal 
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Table 3-5 Results of FHA, FMEA and FTA of the System(cont.) 
Failure condition 
Loss of right main landing gear doors extension 
Severity Related component Failure detect 
method 
Parameters 
Catastrophic L/G lever, 
Door selector valve 
LGCIU1,LGCIU2, 
Gravity extension 
switch, Unlock motors 
LGCIU1,LGCIU2 Electrical power 
signal 
 
Failure condition 
Erroneous nose landing gear extension position indication without warning 
Severity Related component Failure detect 
method 
Parameters 
Catastrophic L/G lever, Gear 
selector valve 
LGCIU1,LGCIU2, 
Proximity sensors 
Warning system 
LGCIU1,LGCIU2 Electrical power 
signal, Sensors 
signal 
 
Failure condition 
Erroneous left main landing gear extension position indication without warning 
Severity Related component Failure detect 
method 
Parameters 
Catastrophic L/G lever, Gear 
selector valve 
LGCIU1,LGCIU2, 
Proximity sensors 
Warning system 
LGCIU1,LGCIU2 Electrical power 
signal, Sensors 
signal 
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Table 3-5 Results of FHA, FMEA and FTA of the System(cont.) 
Failure condition 
Erroneous right main landing gear extension position indication without warning 
Severity Related component Failure detect 
method 
Parameters 
Catastrophic L/G lever, Gear 
selector valve 
LGCIU1,LGCIU2, 
Proximity sensors 
Warning system 
LGCIU1,LGCIU2 Electrical power 
signal, Sensors 
signal 
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4. Diagnosis Technology Research 
4.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, diagnosis research was developed for the Landing gear extension 
and retraction control system based on a selected approach. This chapter can be 
consisted of four parts. First of all, rule-based expert system was chosen from the 
diagnosis approaches introduced in the literature review chapter. Secondly, the 
structure and design of this diagnostic research was developed. The third step was 
to have a case study in order to demonstrate how the diagnosis affects the system. 
Finally, the conclusion was presented. 
4.2 Chosen of Diagnosis Approach 
Rule-based expert system was chosen from the four approaches introduced in 
chapter 2 based on the comparisons given as follows. 
The procedures which a rule-basedaexpert system performs can be divided into 
many steps and translated into rules which describe action that should be taken 
when a symptom is detected. The advantages of this approach are the increase of 
availability, reusability of expertise and reliability for decision making, fast and 
steady response and consistent performance. However, there are challenges of this 
technique, which are the domain knowledge acquisition and the completeness, 
correctness and consistency of the rule base. [9] 
The case-based expert system is highly dependent on a large amount of domain 
knowledge from engineering experiences. The main advantage of a case-based 
system is to make suggestions in new situations which adapt similar cases. 
However, the indexed and retrieved case information are required to support the 
case-based reasoning system, consequently, it is difficult to obtain a complete case 
base. [8] 
The model-based reasoning approaches employ engineering model from basis and 
the interrogation of fault propagation is efficient for a linear dynamic systems. 
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Nevertheless, the drawbacks of it also exist, sufficient model are required, the 
model building and validation are very important for its performance and the 
performance of this approach is unsatisfied for the non-linear and complex system. 
[9]  
Learning system belongs to data-driven approaches which are able to lower the 
dimension of noise and could provide monitoring capability, but sufficient and 
available model sets or system operating data which could derived for a long term 
are needed. [12]  
According to the above comparisons, the writer would prefer to choose rule-based 
expert system for the diagnosis research of landing gear extension/retraction 
control system. The following parts present the details of the application of this 
approach for the system.  
4.3 Architecture of Rule-based Expert Systems 
A routine rule-based expert system is to utilize human expert knowledge to 
overcome real world problems which human intelligence would be normally 
required. An expert system explains and organizes the expert knowledge to be 
rules within computer programme which has the capability of trouble handling. 
Rule-based expert systems play a very important role in intelligent modern systems 
and there have been some successful applications in many ways such as strategic 
goal setting, design, planning, scheduling, diagnosis. The important feature of 
expert system is that the quick response and accurate diagnosis of any failure or 
faults when they occurred, it could solve the actual problems by using domain 
knowledge base. An important advantage of expert systems is that the reasoning 
process could be explained and handles levels of confidence and uncertainty. [29] 
A rule-based expert system utilizes “if-then-else” principle to describe the 
conditional statements which comprise the knowledge base. The architecture of 
rule-based expert system is shown below. There are six basic components included 
in a rule based expert system, they are knowledge base, system data base, 
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inference engine, user interface, knowledge base acquisition facility and 
explanation facility. 
 
Figure 4-1 Architecture of rule-based expert systems [29] 
1) Knowledge base 
The basic function of a knowledge base is that all the rules, cases and relevant 
information are stored and managed. A rule is a translation of a condition of the 
system and related actions. [30] 
2) System data base 
System data base is the special place for the storage of the current system 
operational data which including the real-time system operating status and inputs. 
[8] 
3) Inference engine 
The main responsibility of the inference engine is to find an appropriate or related 
knowledge from the knowledge base according to the data acquired from the 
system data base, and then present the solutions of problems. [29] 
4) User interface 
The function of the user interface is for developers, users and administrators to 
design, update, and use expert systems. [29] 
  System   
data base   
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5) Knowledge base acquisition facility 
The main purpose of the knowledge acquisition is to translate the domain 
knowledge into rules to construct the knowledge base, in other words, it takes the 
responsibility of updating, revising, maintaining and administrating the knowledge 
base. [29] 
6) Explanation facility 
The explanation facility is to explain a problem and its reasoning result for users. 
[29] 
4.4 Design of Rule-based Expert Systems 
4.4.1 Work Flow of a Rule-basedaExpert System 
According to the architecture of a rule-basedaexpert system, the work flow of it 
could be presented as a flowchart given below. 
As it is shown in the figure 4-2, the work flow could be introduced in the process 
given below.  
1) The fault signals are collected and monitored by sensors when the system is in 
operation 
2) The signals are sent to system data base and be filtered, and then translated into 
programs which could be identified. 
3) The program would be sent to the inference engine, and then a rule could be 
selected from the knowledge base. 
4) If a rule which is match the status of the signal is found, appropriate solution 
could be suggested to maintainers to take actions and the problem and its 
reasoning result would be explained to users through explanation facility. 
5) If the feedback from maintainers that the solution is not able to solve the failure, 
the rule would be revised, then a new suggestion will be given to maintainers. 
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Figure 4-2 Flowchart of a rule-based expert system 
6) If there is no rule matching the current status, a warning would be performed to 
notice the system developer, and a solution would be provided to maintainers, and 
the feedback cycle should be performed until a satisfied solution is acquired. 
7) After the failure has been successfully settled, a new rule would be produced and 
saved into the knowledge base.  
4.4.2 Domain Expert Knowledge Acquisition 
According to the work flow, it is clearly that the core element of the rule 
basedaexpert system is the knowledge base. The system could perform well as long 
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as sufficient and enough available domain knowledge can be obtained. 
Consequently, the acquisition of comprehensive domain expert knowledge is in the 
most important factor. The domain expert knowledge could be acquired from three 
aspects: system operational principle, operational experiences and fault tree 
analysis. Failure modes of a system could be conducted based on the system 
operational principle. The domain knowledge could be obtained form the system 
maintenances, system designers and flight crew. Their experiences could provide 
large quantities of practical data for diagnostics. 
The root causes of catastrophic and hazardous events could be identified and 
presented by utilizing fault tree analysis. [8] 
4.5 Case Study 
According to the analysis results developed in chapter 3 and the discussion of 
diagnosis approach shown above, a case study will be given in the following parts. 
First of all, the gear selector valve was chosen form the system. Secondly, failure 
modes of the gear selector valve were summarized. Finally, rule based expert 
system was applied into the gear selector valve. 
4.5.1 Selection of the Gear Selector Valve 
There are mainly two reasons that the gear selector valve is chosen for this case 
study. The first one is that based on the FHA, FMEA and FTA performed in chapter 
3, the results shows that most of the catastrophic events of the landing gear 
extraction/retraction control system are related to the gear selector valve failure. 
Secondly, a survey was performed and it was found that serious problem and 
catastrophic events related to the landing gear control system happened in history. 
For instance, on 14th April 2011, an Air France A330 had an emergency landing 
because there was a problem of the landing gear [36] and on 1st Nov 2011, a 
Boeing 767 had an emergency landing without any landing gear was extended [35]. 
Consequently, the gear selector valve was selected for the case study. 
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4.5.1.1 Introduction of the Gear Selector Valve 
The landing gear selector valve is an electro-mechanical device which could 
change the hydraulic flow to control the extension/retraction of the landing gear. It is 
consisted of two parts which are electrical control part and mechanical part. The 
electrical control part is normally an electromagnetic device which is powered by the 
two LGCIUs. The mechanical part is a moveable component driven by the 
electromagnetic device in order to change the hydraulic flow. When the electrical 
control signal is sent to the valve, the electromagnetic device could drive the 
moveable component to either the extension position or the retraction position. As it 
can be seen from the figure below that the component has the electrical interface 
and the hydraulic interface. 
 
Figure 4-3 Landing gear selector valve 
4.5.2 Failure Modes of Landing Gear Selector Valve 
According to the FMEA developed in chapter 3, the failure modes of the landing 
gear selector valve are listed below. 
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Table 4-1 Failure modes of landing gear selector valve 
Failure modes Local effect System level effect 
Internal leakage 
Loss of the normal 
landing gear door 
extension function 
Reduce the redundancy of 
landing gear extension 
function 
Fails to switch to 
extension position 
Loss of the normal 
landing gear door 
extension function 
Reduce the redundancy of 
landing gear extension 
function 
Fails to switch to 
retraction position 
Loss of the landing 
gear retraction function
Landing gears remain at 
extension position 
Selector valve 
always at extension 
position 
Loss of the landing 
gear retraction function
Landing gears remain at 
extension position 
Selector valve 
always at retraction 
position 
Loss of the normal 
landing gear extension 
function 
Reduce the redundancy of 
landing gear extension 
function 
Loss of the normal 
landing gear extension 
function 
Reduce the redundancy of 
landing gear extension 
function Loss the control of 
actuators Loss of the normal 
landing gear retraction 
function 
Landing gears remain at 
extension position 
4.5.3 Diagnosis of Landing Gear Selector Valve 
According to the failure modes of the landing gear selector valve, the internal 
leakage could be detected by implementing a senor which could detect the acoustic 
signal caused by the leakage. [31] [32] The failure mode which is fails to switch to 
extension position could be caused by electrical power and mechanical fault. The 
electrical power signal could be detected by the LGCIU. The mechanical fault could 
be explored by utilizing a type of sensor which is available to indicate the position of 
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the core of the valve. The main theory of this type of sensor is the same as the 
proximity sensor in the landing gear extension/retraction control system. The 
following three failure modes could be diagnosed by using the same method of the 
second one. The last failure mode could be diagnosed by utilizing the flow sensor 
which could indicate the flow rate of the output of the valve. [33] 
4.5.3.1 Domain Knowledge Representation 
As it was introduced before, the rule based expert system is to translate the domain 
knowledge into program which has the format of “if-then-else”. The following part 
introduces the domain expert knowledge of landing gear selector valve failures. 
According to the failure modes shown in the table 4-1, the latter four failure modes 
could be caused by electrical fault and mechanical fault, because the LGCIU has 
the capability to detect the electrical fault, the writer mainly considered the detection 
of the mechanical fault. In order to present the knowledge clearly, flow chart of each 
rules was given below as well. 
If {“ The internal leakage is detected ” and “ The electrical power of the gear selector 
valve is off. ”} 
Then {Gear selector valve is currently suffering internal leakage.} 
 
Figure 4-4 Flow chart of internal leakage detection 
 44
If {“ The electrical control signal is sent to the gear selector valve to switch to the 
extension position” and “ The position of the core of the gear selector valve is not at 
extension position.”} 
Then {Gear selector valve fails to switch to extension position.} 
 
Figure 4-5 Flow chart of the detection of the valve fails to switch to extension 
position 
If {“ The electrical control signal is sent to the gear selector valve to switch to the 
retraction position” and “ The position of the core of the gear selector valve is not at 
retraction position.”} 
Then {Gear selector valve fails to switch to retraction position.} 
 
Figure 4-6 Flow chart of the detection of the valve fails to switch to retraction 
position 
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If { “ The position of the core of the gear selector valve is at extension position.” and 
“ The extension control signal is not sent to the gear selector valve.”} 
Then {the core of the valve is blocked at extension position.} 
 
Figure 4-7 Flow chart of the detection of the core of the valve is blocked at 
extension position 
If { “The position of the core of the gear selector valve is at retraction position.” and 
“ The retraction control signal is not sent to the gear selector valve.”} 
Then {the core of the valve is blocked at retraction position.} 
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Figure 4-8 Flow chart of the detection of the core of the valve is blocked at retraction 
position 
If {“ The electrical control signal is sent to the gear selector valve to switch to the 
retraction position” and “ The flow rate of the actuator is “0” and “The position of the 
core of the gear selector valve is at retraction position.”} 
Then { The gear selector valve lost the control of actuators.} 
Extension  control 
signal
Has the extension 
control signal been 
sent to the valve ?
yes
Is the valve lost the 
control of the actuator?
The core position 
of the valve
Is the core position at 
extension?
yes
yes
Suggest solution
Flow rate of the 
actuator
Is the flow rate is 
“0"?
yes
 
Figure 4-9 Flow chart of the detection of the loss of the extension control of 
actuators 
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If {“ The electrical control signal is sent to the gear selector valve to switch to the 
extension position” and “ The flow rate of the actuator is “0” and “The position of the 
core of the gear selector valve is at extension position.”} 
Then { The gear selector valve lost the control of actuators.} 
Retraction  control 
signal
Has the retraction 
control signal been 
sent to the valve ?
yes
Is the valve lost the 
control of the actuator?
The core position 
of the valve
Is the core position at 
retraction?
yes
yes
Suggest solution
Flow rate of the 
actuator
Is the flow rate is 
“0"?
yes
 
Figure 4-10 Flow chart of the detection of the loss of the retraction control of 
actuators 
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
Rule-based expert system could increase the availability, reusability of expertise 
and it has the capability of providing reliable decision making, fast and steady 
response and consistent performance. It is suggested that this approach is suitable 
for aircraft landing gear extension/retraction control system to realize the automated 
failure diagnosis. Generally, six basic components are included in a rule based 
expert system; they are knowledge base, system data base, inference engine, user 
interface, knowledge base acquisition facility and explanation facility.  
From the architecture of the rule-based expert system, the acquisition of 
comprehensive domain expert knowledge is in the most important factor, and it 
could be acquired from three aspects: system operational principle, fault tree 
analysis and operational experiences of maintainers.  
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In the case study, according to the FHA, FMEA and FTA, the gear selector valve 
was selected, and the rule based expert system was applied to the valve. In 
addition, the domain knowledge was translated into the format of “if-then-else” 
which could be easily transformed into computer programme. Synchronously, 
according to the failure modes of the gear selector valve, available sensors could 
detect the parameters which can indicate the failure. However, these sensors might 
reduce the reliability of the system and the writer did not consider the installation of 
sensors, consequently, further research is needed to increase the reliability of 
sensors and the installation of them should be taken into account as well.  
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5 Prognostic Technology Research 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, prognosis research was developed for the Landing gear 
extension/retraction control system base on the available approaches introduced in 
chapter 2. This chapter could be consisted of four parts. First of all, the main 
features of each approach introduced in the literature review part was analyzed and 
compared. Secondly, the author determined the approaches which might be 
appropriate for each component according to the features of the components of the 
landing gear extension and retraction control system. The third step was to have a 
case study in order to demonstrate the work flow and how the prognostic affects the 
system. Finally, the conclusion was presented. 
5.2 Research and Application of Prognostic Approaches  
5.2.1 Model-based Prognosis Techniques 
Prognosis for the failure progression could be described in two steps, the first one is 
to estimate the current state accurately, and secondly, a model is required to 
describe the fault evolution. In some cases, it is very difficult to acquire a dynamic 
model according to all the related physical processes. In this situation, it is possible 
to conceive a dynamic model and then identify the model parameters by utilizing the 
inputs and outputs of the system. The following figure shows a classic system 
model identification loop. Prior knowledge leads the experiment design, and data 
can be acquired from the experiment. A system model is conducted together with a 
chosen criterion of fit. Data, the criterion of fit and the model set, are used to 
calculate parameters of the model. After this step, the model will be validated. The 
identification loop will be terminated if the validation is satisfied; otherwise, the loop 
will be move back to the fist step until we get a satisfied solution. There are some 
examples which successfully utilize this approach such as crack propagation of a 
turbine engine, fatigue models, bearing prognosis and etc. [4] 
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Figure 5-1 System model identification loop [4] 
5.2.2 Probability-based Prognosis Techniques 
As it was said in chapter 2 that probabilistic methods for prognosis are very effective 
when previous failures could be provided by historical data. It can be seen from the 
figure 5-2 that each point means a previous failure. Less detailedainformation is 
required than model-basedatechniques. There are advantages provided by these 
methods that the sufficient PDFs could be found from statistical data and 
confidence limits of the result could be given in order to have accurate and precise 
predictions. However, another issue of this approach is that the remaining useful life 
PDF might be recomputed according to the new system information if the system 
has not failed at the time. The prognosis of gas turbine performance and SH-60 
helicopter gearbox has successfully utilized this approach. [4] 
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Figure 5-2 Historical data from previous failures [4] 
5.2.3 Data-drivenaPrediction Techniques 
In many cases, it is impractical to conduct a physics-based model for prediction 
when various historical fault data lead to the failure. It is different from the 
model-based methods that very little estimation is made for the studied problem. 
These approaches could provide a feasible method but the main problem is that the 
decisions are not evident. [4] Some researches show that the data-driven prediction 
approach would suitable for the electronic equipment [34], the Aircraft actuator 
components [38] and the flight control actuators [37]. 
5.3 Landing Gear Extension and Retraction Control System 
Prognostic Approach 
5.3.1 Classification of System Components 
The landing gear extension and retraction control system components are classified 
into three types which are electronic, electro-mechanical and mechanical. The 
detailed information was listed in the table below. 
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Table 5-1 Classification of system components 
Item Component Type of Component Monitoring method 
1 L/G Lever Electronic LGCIU 
2 LGCIU1 Electronic BIT 
3 LGCIU2 Electronic BIT 
4 Door selector valve Electro-mechanical LGCIU 
5 Gear selector valve Electro-mechanical LGCIU 
6 Proximity sensors Electronic LGCIU 
7 Gravity extension 
switch Electronic 
NO 
8 
Gravity extension 
motor 
Electro-mechanical NO 
9 
Gravity extension 
Gear box 
Mechanical NO 
5.3.2 Prognostic Approach of System Components 
As for the LGCIU, the internal structure and the working principle are complicated, 
and as an electronic device, the data driven approach is recommended. [34] The 
L/G lever, proximity sensors and gravity extension switch could use the same 
approach as the LGCIU. 
For the door selector valve and gear selector valve, they are electro-mechanical 
components consisted of two parts which are electrical control part and mechanical 
part. Consequently, it is suggested that a multiple approach which is a combination 
of a data driven approach and a model based approach could be utilized on them.  
? For the mechanical part, the fault progression could be caused by the friction 
which the feature of fault progression is similar with bearing, as a result, model 
based approach might be suitable for the mechanical part.  
? For the electrical control part, the data driven approach could be utilized. 
A probability based technology has been successfully utilized on SH-60 Helicopter 
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gear box. [4] As for the gravity extension gear box, the same method could be 
applied.  
Table 5-2 Summary of System Prognostic Approaches 
Item Component 
Type of 
Component 
Prognostic Approach 
1 L/G Lever Electronic Data driven approach 
2 LGCIU1 Electronic Data driven approach 
3 LGCIU2 Electronic Data driven approach 
4 
Door selector 
valve 
Electro-mechanical
Data driven andamodel based 
approach 
5 
Gear selector 
valve 
Electro-mechanical
Data driven andamodel based 
approach 
6 
Proximity 
sensors 
Electronic Data driven approach 
7 Gravity 
extension switch Electronic 
Data driven approach 
8 
Gravity 
extension motor 
Electro-mechanical
Data driven andamodel based 
approach 
9 
Gravity 
extension Gear 
box 
Mechanical Probability based approach 
5.4 Case study 
The key of prognosis is to identify the prognostic feature related to the failure 
progression of failure models. For the gear selector valve, the failure modes were 
listed in the table 4-1. The failure mode which is “fails to switch to extension 
position” was chosen for this case study. All the other failure modes could be 
analyzed by following the same process presented in this case study. The detailed 
analyses will be introduced below. 
In order to identify the prognostic feature of this failure mode, the causes of it must 
 54
be recognized. As it was mentioned in chapter 4, this failure mode could be caused 
by the fault of electrical control devices and mechanical parts. On one hand, the 
electrical control part could be normally consisted of two electrical devices which 
are an electromagnetic winding driving the core of the valve and a diode restraining 
the voltage spike caused by the electromagnetic winding. Either the short circuit of 
these two components or the open circuit of the winding could cause this failure. On 
the other hand, for the mechanical fault, the core of the valve could be blocked by 
the metal scraps produced by the friction. 
After identifying the causes of the failure, the prognostic feature was analyzed for 
each causes of the failure mode. It is suggested that the prognostic feature of the 
electromagnetic winding could be the change of its resistance. [39] The prognostic 
feature of the blockage of the core of the valve could be the quantity level of metal 
scraps in hydraulic oil. Sensors are required to detect the parameters which could 
indicate the prognostic features. 
5.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this chapter, three typical approaches were discussed in the above sections, 
each approach could be utilized in different areas. Appropriate prognosis approach 
was recommended to each component of the system according to the features of 
these components. 
In the case study, the failure mode which is “fails to switch to extension position” 
was chosen, and then, the causes of this failure were analyzed, the last progress 
was that the prognostic features of the causes were identified. All the other failure 
modes could be analyzed by following the same process presented in this case 
study. 
Synchronously, sensors are required to detect the parameters which can indicate 
the failure progression. However, these sensors might reduce the reliability of the 
system and the writer did not consider the installation of sensors, consequently, 
further research is needed to increase the reliability of sensors and the installation 
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of them should be taken into account as well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 56
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 57
6 The DPHM Architecture of Landing Gear Extension and 
Retraction Control System 
In this chapter, firstly, a comprehensive integrated DPHM architecture of landing 
gear extension/retraction control system was introduced. Secondly, the working 
process was given. Finally, the relationship between the DPHM architecture of 
landing gear extension/retraction control system and the aircraft level PHM were 
presented. 
6.1 Framework of Landing Gear Extension and Retraction Control 
System DPHM 
The following figure 6-1 illustrates a typical IVHM architecture including the 
on-board system which means Operational Maintenance Program (OMP), off-board 
system and integrated aircraft support system. All of these systems should be 
integrated in order to have an effective acquisition and communication of the related 
information of health condition and this information would be collected by the DPHM 
control management unit.  
 
 
Figure 6-1: On-board and Off-board Elements of IVHM [40] 
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The DPHM system includes not only the health management technology, but also 
the integrated maintenance information. The health state information of the system 
has the capability of noticing the flight crew and maintainer simultaneously. [8] 
The IVHM architecture has six layers which are signal processing, health 
assessment, condition monitoring, prognostics, presentation and decision support. 
First of all, the signal processing layer is to process the inputs of sensor data and 
the system control data. The condition monitoring layer has the capability of 
reporting on the condition of a component or a subsystem. The responsibility of 
health assessment is to perform the diagnostics and give health information about 
components or subsystems. The prognostics layer could estimate the 
remainingauseful life (RUL) of a component. The decision support layer could 
monitor the IVHM system performance and support maintenance management. 
Finally the presentation layer is connected with the IVHM system users. [40] 
As it was introduced above that the DPHM system includes two parts, on-boarda 
system and off-board system, and the DPHM of landing gear extension and 
retraction control system is shown in figure 6-2. 
6.1.1 On-board System 
The onboard system has the capability to assess the health of components or 
subsystem in real time. It consists of sensors, landing gear extension and retraction 
control system elements and avionics devices related to health management. The 
Diagnosis and Prognosis Processing Module and the signal processing unit could 
be integrated with the landing gear control and interface unit (LGCIU), and the 
sensors required for diagnosis and prognosis could be integrated with the system 
components when they are manufactured as well. Consequently, according to the 
sensors signal and the system control signal provided by other component without 
sensors, the on-board system could monitor the system health condition accurately. 
The main functions of an on-board system are listed below: 
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a) System health data acquisition 
b) Monitor the landing gear extension and retraction control system status 
c) Fault diagnosis 
d) Suggest solutions 
e) Fault information display and explanation 
f) Communicate with aircraft DPHM 
6.1.2 Off-board System 
The off-board system consists of a ground based reasoner (GBR) and a 
maintenance data warehouse (MDW) to support the post-processing which has the 
capability of health prognostic and usage trending. The GBR compare the historical, 
maintenance and diagnostic/prognostic data with the on-board  
 
 
Figure 6-2 DPHM of landing gear extension and retraction control system [6] 
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system condition data, and then produce diagnostic/prognostic data for the 
maintenance resource management unit which could guide the maintenance 
activities. [40] 
The main functions of an off-board system are listed below: 
a) Communicate with aircraft DPHM 
b) System components prognosis 
c) Management of maintenance actions  
d) Maintenance information management 
6.2 Working Process of Landing Gear Extensionaand Retraction 
Control System DPHM 
According to the DPHM of landing gear extension/retraction control system shown 
in the figure above, the work flow of it was presented as follows: 
a. When the system works, the health status of major components are monitored 
by the sensors and fault signals are collected; 
b. The signals should be processed; 
c. The feature of collected signals will be identified; 
d. The DPHM decide whether the components is failure or not based on the 
diagnosis and prognosis techniques; 
e. If the component is not failure, the acquired information will be analyzed based 
on the prognosis techniques and the remaining time to failure of the component 
could be provided. 
f. If the component is failure, the reason and the suggestion will be given. The 
information will be recorded by DPHM; 
g. All of these information will be transmitted to the aircraft DPHM,  
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h. The information could be sent to ground-based maintenance module to guide 
the maintainer’s activity. 
6.3 Relationship with Aircraft DPHM and Benefits 
The paragraphs above introduced the DPHM architecture of landing gear extension 
and retraction control system. However, other systems onboard such as flight 
control system, fuel system, hydraulic system, EPS, avionics and aircraft structure 
require health management technologies as well. Consequently, the DPHM should 
consider the whole aircraft, not a single system. The system DPHM could 
communicate with the aircraft DPHM by utilizing data bus. 
It is clearly that the maintenance activity could be improved a lot because of the 
utilization of diagnosis and prognosis technology. On one hand, for the application 
of diagnosis technology, the reasons and solutions of a fault can be identified; as a 
result, a lot of time can be saved for recovering the failure. On the other hand, for 
the application of prognosis technology, the remaining usefulalife of a component 
could be estimated; consequently, the maintenance activity could be arranged 
without interrupting the normal flight mission. That is to say the cost could be 
reduced. 
6.4 Conclusions 
The landing gear extension and retraction control system DPHM integrate onboard 
system and off- board system, all the functions and the working process were given 
to fulfill the requirement of the system health management. The development of 
DPHM should consider the whole aircraft instead of focusing on a single system. 
Owing to the implementation of the diagnosis and prognosis technology, the 
maintenance activity could be improved a lot; as a result, the maintenance cost 
could be reduced. 
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7. Conclusion and Future Work 
7.1 Conclusion 
The main objective of this thesis was to build a set of diagnosis, prognosis and 
health management methods which are suitable for the aircraft landing gear 
extension and retraction control system. The research works were performed as 
follows: 
First of all, this thesis began with the literature review chapter. The footprint of the 
revolution and the development of the DPHM technology were introduced. Then the 
successful applications of PHM system were presented as well. The literature 
review also provided the detailed information of diagnosis approaches and 
prognosis approaches. 
Secondly, based on the research methodology, the landing gear 
extension/retraction control system of AIRBUS A330 was chosen as a case study. 
All the following research works in this thesis were dependent on this system. The 
schematic diagram of the system was given and the operational functions of the 
whole system were identified. 
After introducing the landing gear extension and retraction control system, the FHA, 
FMEA and FTA for the system were conducted. From the FHA, each of the 
catastrophic events of the landing gear extension/retraction control system was 
identified. The FHA is also a starting point of the FMEA and FTA. The detailed 
results of FHA were shown in the Appendix B. A FMEA for the system was 
performed after the FHA. In the FMEA, all the failure modes of each component of 
the system and their effects were determined, and each failure was classified 
according to the severity classification. The detailed results of FMEA were shown in 
the Appendix C. Then the FTA was performed to identify the root causes of each top 
event. The detailed results of FTA were shown in the Appendix D. According to the 
combination of the results from FHA, FMEA and FTA, all the root causes and their 
effects were identified, synchronously; all the components which are related to the 
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catastrophic events are listed. Consequently, the crucial components of the system 
could be identified and the key parameters of the components could be acquired.  
According to the results of the system analysis and comparisons of diagnostic 
approaches, rule-based expert system was chosen for the landing gear extension 
and retraction control system DPHM. Six basic components are included in a rule 
based expert system, they are knowledge base, system data base, inference 
engine, user interface, knowledge base acquisition facility and explanation facility. 
The architecture of the rule-based expert system, the acquisition of comprehensive 
domain expert knowledge is in the most important factor, and it could be acquired 
from three aspects: system operational principle, fault tree analysis and operational 
experiences of maintainers. It is suggested that this approach is suitable for aircraft 
landing gear extension/retraction control system to realize the automated failure 
diagnosis. 
In the prognostic research, three typical approaches were discussed in the above 
sections. Each approach could be utilized in different areas. An appropriate 
prognosis approach was recommended for each component of the system, 
according to the features of these components. In the case study, the failure mode 
which is “fails to switch to extension position” was chosen, and then, the causes of 
this failure were analyzed, the last progress was that the prognostic features of the 
causes were identified. All the other failure modes could be analyzed by following 
the same process presented in this case study. 
Finally, a comprehensive integrated DPHM architecture of landing gear extension 
and retraction control system was developed. The operational process for the 
system was also expressed.  
In conclusion, a complete DPHM system was provided by the research given above 
for the system. It has the capability to monitor the system status, detect the 
abnormal signals, diagnose system failures, provide solutions to maintainers and 
indicate the remaining useful life of a component or the system. It is clear that the 
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maintenance activity could be improved a lot because of the utilization of diagnosis 
and prognosis technology. In other words, the unscheduled maintenance could be 
reduced. Consequently, the maintenance activity could be arranged without 
interrupting the normal flight mission. That is to say the maintenance cost could be 
reduced. All of the research objectives were achieved. 
7.2 Future Work 
This thesis mainly focused on the component and system level to utilize the system 
real-time status monitoring, diagnostics and prognostics. However, the DPHM of the 
landing gear extension and retraction control system should not be isolated with the 
aircraft level DPHM. The interface between them shall be considered.  
As it was mentioned earlier, various sensors were required for the diagnosis and 
prognosis research. The writer mainly considered the type of sensors which could 
be utilized, but the sensors installation which could greatly affect the performance of 
them was not considered and the sensors reliability is needed to be determined as 
well. 
Because of the lack of component and system data and the internal structure of 
components, the prognostic research works focused on the qualitative analysis and 
the prognosis process, not quantitative analysis and algorithm, the failure modes of 
a component may not be fully understood. Future works are needed after acquiring 
the component and system data and the internal structure of components.  
As it was mentioned earlier, the maintenance cost could be reduced. However, the 
cost of the system installation and operation such as mass and power requirements 
is still need to be studied to find the net cost benefit.  
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Appendix A: GDP Report 
A.1 GDP Introduction 
A1.1 Background 
FW-11 is a project cooperated between Aviation Industry Corporation of China 
(AVIC) and Cranfield University. This group design project is a new conceptual 
design and the target of it is to develop a flying wing commercial airliner.FW-11, a 
200-seat airliner which the range is 7500 nm, mainly focuses on Asia-Pacific region 
market. As a part of AVIC MSc program, the FW-11 project is constructed by three 
phases: conceptual design phase, preliminary design phase, and detail design 
phase. The author was involved in the conceptual design phase which could be 
divided into three steps: derivation of requirements, design a conventional aircraft 
as baseline aircraft and design FW-11 comparing with the baseline aircraft. 
A.1.2 Main Tasks 
The author was in charge of the engine market, engine selection, engine sizing and 
performance. For the engine selection, the writer will select an existing engine from 
the market firstly, and then a new concept engine will be considered so that the 
performance of them can be compared by utilizing the TURBOMATCH. 
According to the development procedure of the FW-11, a conventional configuration 
was developed firstly for comparison, and then the flying wing configuration was 
considered. 
A.2 Engine Market 
According to the Rolls-Royce market outlook, it can be seen from the tables below 
that in the next 20 years 141,000 engines will be demanded for the engine market 
which worth over $800 billions and the twin-aisle aircraft has the biggest portion in 
terms of value. 
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Table A-1 Engine delivery summary 2009~2028 [17] 
 
 
 
 
Table A-2 Aircraft delivery summary 2009~2028 [17] 
 
Separating the engine market into different range of thrust, the two tables below 
shows that the thrust over 22000 lb have the biggest value and the most delivery 
units. 
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Table A-3 engine delivery value [17] 
 
 
 
 
Table A-4 engine delivery units [17] 
 
A3 Engine Selection, Sizing and Performance 
As the concept of this project was considered to be developed in three stages, a 
conventional configuration aircraft was developed, then some unconventional 
concept options were compared, finally the flying wing concept aircraft was built. In 
terms of the development of the project, appropriate engines should be selected for 
the firstly. 
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For the engine selection, the writer will select an existing engine from the market 
firstly, and then a new concept engine will be considered so that the performance of 
them can be compared. 
From the technology aspect, there are some new engine concepts we should 
consider which are geared turbofan, open rotor, intercool and recuperated and etc. 
Each of the new concept engines has advantage and disadvantage and also needs 
new technology. 
Table A-5 pros and cons of engine concepts [18] 
Engine concepts Advantages Disadvantages 
Low SFC Noise due to absence of nacelle 
Very high BPR means high 
propulsive efficiency Cabin noise Open Rotor 
Lighter engine with lower 
drag due to the absence of 
the fan case 
Sonic fatigue for 
aircraft-engine 
integration 
High BPR Technology needed for cooling system Geared Turbofan higher fan efficiency and 
lower fan noise Uncertainty of the weight
lower emission and core 
weight 
New components 
contribute to engine 
weight and maintenance 
cost 
Intercool and 
recuperated aero 
engine 
Higher efficiency  
 
On one hand, the performance of these new concept engines was compared; 
engine models were built by utilizing TURBOMATCH. The models are shown in 
appendix A1, A2 and A3. It can be seen from the Table 3-6 that the SFC of open 
rotor engine and Intercool and recuperated aero engine are lower than the geared 
turbofan engine. On the other hand, there are engine concept might be available for 
our aircraft, however, according to the EIS of the aircraft is 2020, the EIS of the 
engine should be before 2020 in order to reduce the risk. Consequently, geared 
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turbofan engines should be our best choice of FW-11. 
Table A-6 Simulation results of new concept engines 
 Altitude(m) Flight Mach 
Number 
SFC (mg/Ns) 
Open rotor 10680 0.82 14.78769 
GTF&ICA 10680 0.82 14.98499 
GTF 10680 0.82 15.20291 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-1 Emission and EIS of engines [20] 
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Figure A-2 SFC Reduction by Bypass Ratio [41] 
The thrust requirements of aircraft can be calculated by the following equation with 
considering 10% installation loss. [19] 
 
      : Thrust requirement 
: Take off weight 
 
: Take off thrust weight ratio 
 
A3.1 Engines for Conventional Configuration Aircraft 
As the thrust weight ratio is recommended by the parameter team are 
0.295(medium range) and 0.25(long range), and the maximum takeoff mass are 
195445kg (medium range) and 188182kg (long range), the thrust requirement could 
be calculated by the equation shown above. The overall thrust required are 632kN 
(medium range) and 506kN (long range). Considering the family issue, one type of 
engine is selected for both medium range and long range baseline engine, which is 
Trent 700. 
In order to provide performance parameters of the engine to the performance team, 
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a model of Trent 700 need to be conducted by utilizing TURBOAMTCH which is a 
kind of engine simulation software. Main parameters of the engine could be found in 
JANES’ book, such as OPR, FPR, mass flow, SFC, etc. The simulation result is 
presented in the table 3-4 below. 
Table A-7 Simulation result and dimensions of Trent 700 [21] 
 Long range Medium range 
MTOW@ISA+10oC, Sea level 188,182kg 195,445kg 
Overall thrust required 506kN 632kN 
Number of engine 2 
Installation Under-wing mounted 
Thrust required per engine 253kN 316kN 
Baseline engine Trent 700 
Fan diameter 2.47m 
Length 3.91m 
Dry weight 4,785kg 
SFC@ISA+15oC, Sea level 8.97mg/Ns 
SFC@35000ft, M=0.85 17.01mg/Ns 
As is mentioned above, geared turbofan engine is selected to be mounted on the 
conventional configuration aircraft. An engine model was built to simulate its 
performance base on the same thrust provided as Trent 700, and the simulation 
result is shown in the table 3-5 below. The model was built according to the engine 
model conducted by AVIC team in Cranfield University. [22]  
Table A-8 Simulation result of GTF for conventional configuration aircraft 
SFC@ISA+15oC, Sea level 6.72mg/Ns 
SFC@35000ft, M=0.85 15.20mg/Ns 
 
A3.2 Engine for FW-11 
As the thrust weight ratio is recommended by the parameter team is 0.205, and the 
maximum takeoff mass is 176469kg, the thrust requirement could be calculated by 
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utilizing the same equation as the conventional one. The thrust required is 196kN 
per engine. 
Because of the existing engines at this thrust level are outdated which means the 
performance are dissatisfied, the writer chose GTF engine for FW-11 directly. Then 
the GTF engine could be sized as follow. 
According to reference [23], the diameter and mass are scaled by using following 
equations, respectively. 
 
 
: Fan diameter 
 : Net thrust 
: Mass  
: Fan diameter of reference engine 
: Net thrust of reference engine 
: Mass of reference engine 
 
Then the diameter and mass could be estimated based on the reference engine 
which is PW1000 developed by Pratt&Whitney. Parameters of the reference engine 
are listed below.  
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Table A-9: The Parameters of Reference Engine [24] 
 
According to the above engine, the parameters of the GTF engine of FW-11 are 
calculated and the results are shown below. 
Table A-10 Simulation result and dimensions of GTF for FW-11 
Bypass ratio 11 
Fan diameter 2.87m 
Length 3.17m 
Dry weight 4,702kg 
Static uninstalled thrust@ISA+15oC, Sea level 196kN 
Uninstalled thrust@ISA+10oC, Sea level, Take 
off 
178kN 
Uninstalled thrust@35000ft, M=0.82 56kN 
SFC@ISA+15oC, Sea level 6.72mg/Ns 
SFC@35000ft, M=0.82 15.20mg/Ns 
 
The TURBOMATCH simulation results of GTF for FW-11 are given in the figures 
below. 
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Figure A-3 Thrust Vs Various Altitude and Mach number 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-4 SFC Vs Various Altitude and Mach number 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-5 SP.THRUST Vs Various Altitude and Mach number 
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These results are given to the performance team in order to validate the thrust 
provided by the engine can fulfill the thrust requirement at different flight phases, 
and according to the validation, the thrust level is satisfied. 
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Appendix A1 
The TURBOMATCH model of an open rotor engine is presented as follow.  
//// 
OD SI KE VA FP 
-1 
-1 
INTAKE    S1,3  D1-4  R200 
INTAKE    S2,25  D5-8  R390 
COMPRE  S3,4  D9-15  R210 V9 V10 
PREMAS  S4,20,5 D16-19 
COMPRE  S5,6  D20-26  R220 V20 V21 
PREMAS  S6,21,7 D27-30 
ARITHY   D400-404 
COMPRE  S7,8  D31-37  R230 V31 
PREMAS  S8,22,9 D38-41 
PREMAS  S9,23,10 D42-45 
BURNER  S10,11  D46-48 R240 
MIXEES  S11,22,12 
ARITHY  D405-411 
TURBIN  S12,13  D49-56,250,57 V50 
MIXEES  S13,23,14 
MIXEES  S14,21,15 
ARITHY  D412-416 
TURBIN  S15,16  D58-65,260,66 V59 
ARITHY  D450-457 
COMPRE  S25,26  D70-76 R270 V70 V71 
TURBIN  S16,17  D100,77-83,270,85 V77 
DUCTER  S17,18  D86-89 
NOZCON  S18,19,1 D90 R290 
NOZCON  S26,27,1 D91 R300 
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ARITHY   D420-426 
ARITHY   D430-436 
ARITHY   D440-446 
ARITHY   D450-456 
OUTPBD  D290,200,300,390,21,32,500,510,520 
PERFOR  S1,2,0  D92-95,290,200,240,300,390,0,0,0,0 
CODEND 
//// 
! INLET 1 
1 10680.0  
2 0.0  
3 0.8 
4 -1.0 
 
! INLET 2 
5 10680.0  
6 0.0  
7 0.8  
8 -1.0  
 
! LOW PRESSURE COMPRESSOR 
9 0.85  
10 -1.0  
11 2.449813  
12 0.91  
13 0.0  
14 4.0  
15 0.0 
 
! AIR BLEED 
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16 0.00  
17 0.0  
18 1.0  
19 0.0  
 
! HPC1 COMPRESSOR 
20 0.85  
21 -1.0 
22 7.9556 
23 0.9 
24 1.0  
25 5.0  
26 0.0  
 
! Sealing Air to LPT 
27 0.01  
28 0.0  
29 1.0  
30 0.0  
 
! HPC2 COMPRESSOR 
31 0.85  
32 -1.0  
33 1.847  
34 0.9  
35 1.0  
36 2.0  
37 0.0 
 
! Cooling Air to HPT NGV and Blade 
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38 0.075  
39 0.0  
40 1.0  
41 0.0 
 
! Cooling Air to HPT Blade  
42 0.01622  
43 0.0  
44 1.0 
45 0.0  
 
! BURNER 
46 0.045  
47 0.999  
48 -1.0  
 
! TURBINE-HPT 
49 0.0 
50 -1.0 
51 -1.0  
52 0.93 
53 -1.0  
54 2.0 
55 5.0 
56 -1.0  
57 0.0  
 
! TURBINE-LPT 
58 0.0  
59 -1.0  
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60 -1.0 
61 0.934 
62 -1.0 
63 1.0 
64 5.0 
65 -1.0  
66 0.0  
 
! COUNTER-ROTATING FAN 
70 0.85 
71 -1.0 
72 1.15  
73 0.915  
74 1.0  
75 1.0 
76 0.0 
 
! TURBINE-LPT 
100 0.0 
77 -1.0  
78 -1.0  
79 0.934 
80 -1.0 
81 4.0 
82 5.0  
83 -1.0  
85 0.0  
 
! CORE DUCT 
86 0.0  
 89
87 0.0  
88 0.0 
89 1.E6  
 
! CONVERGENT NOZZLE 
90 -1.0  
 
! CONVERGENT NOZZLE 
91 1.0  
 
! PERFORMANCE 
92 -1.0 
93 -1.0  
94 0.0  
95 0.0  
 
! ARITHY 
400 5.0  
401 -1.0 
402 32.0  
403 -1.0 
404 21.0 
 
! ARITHY  
405 1.0 
406 -1.0 
407 250.0  
408 -1.0 
409 220.0  
410 -1.0 
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411 230.0  
 
! ARITHY  
412 5.0  
413 -1.0 
414 260.0  
415 -1.0 
416 210.0 
 
! ARITHY  
420 2.0  
421 -1.0 
422 500.0  
423 -1.0 
424 290.0  
425 -1.0 
426 200.0  
 
! ARITHY 
430 2.0  
431 -1.0 
432 510.0 
433 -1.0 
434 300.0  
435 -1.0 
436 390.0 
 
! ARITHY 
440 4.0  
441 -1.0 
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442 520.0  
443 -1.0 
444 510.0 
445 -1.0 
446 500.0  
 
! ARITHY  
450 3.0 
451 -1.0 
452 823.0 
453 -1.0 
454 823.0 
455 -1.0 
456 457.0 
457 1.0 
-1 
1 2 48.0 ! INLET MASS FLOW 
2 2 1200.0 ! BYPASS MASS FLOW 
11 6 1400.0 ! TET 
-1 
1  10680.0     
2  0.0         
3  0.82        
5  10680.0     
6  0.0       
7  0.82        
-1 
-1 
-3 
 
 92
Appendix A2 
The TURBOMATCH model of an Intercool and recuperated aero engine is 
presented as follow. 
//// 
OD SI KE VA FP 
-1 
-1 
INTAKE  S1,2  D1-4  R300 
COMPRE  S2,3  D5-11  R310  V5  V6 
PREMAS  S3,4,22 D12-15  V12 
MIXEES  S22,31,23 
PREMAS  S23,24,29 D16-19  V16     
DUCTER  S29,30  D20-23        
HETCOL  S24,25  D24-27 
MIXFUL  S25,30,26 D28-30   
DUCTER  S26,27  D31-34        
NOZCON  S27,28,1 D35  R330 
ARITHY              D200-207 
COMPRE  S4,5  D36-42  R340     V36  
PREMAS  S5,6,31     D43-46 
PREMAS  S6,7,32     D215-218 
HETHOT  S24,7,8     D47-50 
COMPRE  S8,9        D51-57       R350     V51   V52 
DUCTER  S9,10       D58-61        
PREMAS  S10,11,33   D62-65 
PREMAS  S11,12,34   D219-222 
HETCOL  S12,13      D66-69 
DUCTER  S13,14      D70-73        
BURNER  S14,15      D74-76       R370 
MIXEES  S15,33,16 
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TURBIN  S16-17      D77-84,350,85            V78 
ARITHY              D208-214 
TURBIN  S17,18      D86-93,345,94            V87 
HETHOT  S12,18,19   D95-98 
DUCTER  S19,20      D99-102        
NOZCON  S20,21,1    D103          R400 
OUTPBD              D207,209,8 
PERFOR  S1,0,0  D104-107,330,300,370,400,0,0,0,0,0 
CODEND 
//// 
1 10680.0              
2 0.0               
3 0.82              
4 1.0                
 
5 0.85             
6 1.0              
7 1.7             
8 0.915             
9 0.0                 
10 1.0               
11 0.0            
 
12 0.083333       !Wout.1/Win  --- BYPASS SPLITTER  
13 0.0                
14 1.0             
15 0.0             
 
16  0.2            
17  0.0              
 94
18  1.0              
19  0.0            
 
20 0.0               
21 0.00          
22 0.0             
23 0.0            
 
24 0.1              
25 0.6             
26 1.0 
27 0.0             
 
28  1.0             
29  1.0 
30  0.4            
 
31 0.0              
32 0.00            
33 0.0               
34 0.0            
35 -1.0             
 
!ARITHY:BOOSTER SPEED=FAN SPEED 
200  5.0              
201 -1.0 
202 37.0            
203 -1.0 
204  6.0             
205 -1.0 
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206  207.0          
207  1.0           
 
36 0.85              
37 1.0              
38 2.377            
39 0.91             
40 0.0            
41 2.0           
42 0.0            
 
43 1.0             
44 0.0             
45 1.0              
46 0.0              
 
215 1.000            
216 0.000            
217 1.000            
218 0.000           
 
47 0.1             
48 0.6          
49 1.0 
50 0.02               
 
51 0.85              
52 1.0           
53 8.91          
54 0.9            
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55 0.0                
56 3.0               
57 0.0            
 
58 0.0              
59 0.00             
60 0.0              
61 0.0            
 
62 0.8            
63 0.0              
64 0.98             
65 0.0            
 
219 1.000           
220 0.00             
221 1.000             
222 0.000            
  
66 0.1             
67 0.73         
68 1.0 
69 0.02         
 
70 0.0        
71 0.0 
72 0.0 
73 0.0                                                                          
74 0.05          
75 0.99            
 97
76 -1.0          
 
77 0.0        
78 0.8            
79 0.6             
80 0.93           
81 -1.0           
82 3.0              
83 3.0           
84 -1.0            
85 0.0      
 
!ARITHY: LPTWORK 
208  1.0        
209 -1.0 
210  345.0           
211 -1.0 
212  310.0          
213 -1.0 
214  340.0       
 
86 0.0              
87 0.8               
88 0.6              
89 0.934           
90 -1.0             
91 1.0              
92 3.0            
93 -1.0             
94  0.0            
 98
95 0.1              
96 0.73          
97 1.0 
98 0.02        
 
99 0.0        
100 0.0 
101 0.0 
102 0.0 
 
103 -1.0            
104 -1.0             
105 -1.0             
106 0.0            
107 0.0            
-1 
1  2    430.0        ! MASS FLOW  
15  6   1630.0        !TET 
-1 
-3 
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Appendix A3 
 
The TURBOMATCH model of a GTF aero engine is presented as follow. 
//// 
OD SI KE VA FP 
-1 
-1 
INTAKE  S1,2 D1-4 R200 
COMPRE  S2,3 D5-11 R210 V5 V6 
PREMAS  S3,16,4 D12-15 V12 
ARITHY  D90-94 
COMPRE  S4,5 D16-22 R230 V16 
PREMAS  S5,17,6 D23-26 
MIXEES  S16,17,18 
DUCTER  S18,19 D27-30 R220 
NOZCON  S19,20,1 D31 R290 
COMPRE  S6,7 D32-38 R240 V32 V33 
PREMAS  S7,21,26 D39-42 
ARITHY  D95-99 
COMPRE  S26,8 D43-49 R270 V43 
PREMAS  S8,22,27 D50-53 
PREMAS  S27,23,9 D55-58 
BURNER  S9,10 D59-61 R250 
MIXEES  S10,22,11 
ARITHY  D407-413 
TURBIN  S11,12 D62-69,280,88 V63 
MIXEES  S12,23,13 
MIXEES  S13,21,14 
ARITHY  D400-406 
TURBIN  S14,15 D70-77,260,89 V71 
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DUCTER  S15,24 D78-81 
NOZCON  S24,25,1 D82 R300 
PERFOR  S1,0,0 D83-86,300,200,250,290,0,0,0,0,0 
CODEND 
BRICK DATA//// 
 
! INLET 
1 10680.0  
2 0.0  
3 0.8  
4 -1  
 
! FAN 
5 0.85 ! SURGE MARGINE 
6 1.0 
7 1.45 
8 0.915 
9 0.0  
10 1.0  
11 0.0 ! 
 
! BYPASS-MAIN 
12 0.916667 
13 0.0  
14 1.0  
15 0.0  
 
! BOOSTER 
16 0.85  
17 1.0  
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18 1.6901 
19 0.91  
20 1.0 
21 1.0  
22 0.0  
 
! AIR BLEED 
23 0.00  
24 0.0 
25 1.0 
26 0.0  
 
! BYPASS-DUCT 
27 0.0  
28 0.01  
29 0.0 
30 1.E6  
 
! FAN NOZZLE 
31 -1.0  
 
! HPC1 COMPRESSOR 
32 0.85 
33 1.0  
34 7.9556  
35 0.9 
36 1.0  
37 5.0  
38 0.0  
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! Sealing Air to LPT 
39 0.01 
40 0.0 
41 1.0  
42 0.0  
 
! HPC2 COMPRESSOR 
43 0.85  
44 1.0  
45 1.847  
46 0.9  
47 1.0  
48 2.0  
49 0.0  
 
! Cooling Air to HPT NGV and HPT Blade 
50 0.075 ! Mass Flow RATIO 
51 0.0 ! MASS FLOW LOSS 
52 1.0  
53 0.0  
 
! Cooling Air to HPT Blade 
55 0.01622 ! Mass Flow RATIO 
56 0.0 ! MASS FLOW LOSS 
57 1.0  
58 0.0  
 
! BURNER 
59 0.045 
60 0.999  
 103
61 -1.0  
 
! TURBINE-HPT 
62 0.0  
63 -1.0  
64 -1.0   
65 0.903  
66 -1.0   
67 3.0   
68 5.0   
69 -1.0  
 
! TURBINE-LPT 
70 0.0  
71 -1.0  
72 -1.0  
73 0.934  
74 -1.0  
75 1.0  
76 5.0  
77 -1.0  
 
! CORE DUCT 
78 0.0  
79 0.0  
80 0.0  
81 1.E6  
 
! CONVERGENT NOZZLE 
82 -1.0  
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! PERFORMANCE 
83 -1.0  
84 -1.0  
85 0.0  
86 0.0  
 
! Turbine NGV Angle 
88 0.0 
89 0.0 
 
! ARITHY : BOOSTER SPEED = FAN SPEED 
90 5.0  
91 -1.0 
92 17.0  
93 -1.0 
94 6.0  
 
! ARITHY : HPC1 Speed = HPC2 SPEED 
95 5.0  
96 -1.0 
97 44.0  
98 -1.0 
99 33.0  
 
! ARITHY : LPTWORK = BOOSTERWORK + FANWORK 
400 1.0 
401 -1.0 
402 260.0  
403 -1.0 
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404 210.0  
405 -1.0 
406 230.0  
 
! ARITHY : HPTWORK = HPC1  WORK + HPC2  WORK 
407 1.0  
408 -1.0 
409 280.0 
410 -1.0 
411 240.0  
412 -1.0 
413 270.0  
-1 
1 2 495.0 ! MASS FLOW 
10 6 1510.0 !  TET 
-1 
-3 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B Landing gear extension/retraction control system FHA summary 
 
Function 
Failure Condition 
(Hazard 
Description) 
Flight 
Phase 
Effect of Failure Condition on 
1.Aircraft 2.Crew 3.Occupants Hazard Class 
Loss of nose landing 
gear extension Landing 
1. The aircraft will lose nose 
landing gear extension function 
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased significantly 
3. Occupants might be injured 
Catastrophic 
Loss of nose landing 
gear retraction Take off 
1. The aircraft will lose nose 
landing gear retraction function 
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased  
3. No effect on occupants. 
Minor  
Lose of left main 
landing gear 
extension 
Landing 
1. The aircraft will lose left main 
landing gear extension function 
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased significantly 
3. Occupants might be injured 
Catastrophic 
Control nose 
landing gear and 
main landing gear 
extension/retraction 
 
Lose of left main 
landing gear 
retraction 
Take off 
1. The aircraft will lose left main 
landing gear retraction function 
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased  
3. No effect on occupants. 
Minor 
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Table B Landing gear extension/retraction control system FHA summary 
 
Function 
Failure Condition 
(Hazard 
Description) 
Flight 
Phase 
Effect of Failure Condition on 
1.Aircraft 2.Crew 3.Occupants Hazard Class 
Lose of right main 
landing gear 
extension 
Landing 
1. The aircraft will lose right main 
landing gear extension function 
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased significantly 
3.  Occupants might be injured 
Catastrophic 
Control nose 
alanding gear and 
main landing gear 
extension/retraction Lose of right main 
landing gear 
retraction 
Take off 
1. The aircraft will lose right main 
landing gear retraction function 
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased  
3.  No effect on occupants. 
Minor 
Loss of nosealanding 
gear doors extension Landing 
1. If the aircraft lose this function, it 
will result in the loss of nose 
landing gear extension function.
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased significantly 
3. Occupants might be injured 
Catastrophic 
Control nose 
alanding gear doors 
and mainalanding 
gear doors 
extension/retraction Loss of nosealanding 
gear doors retraction Take off 
1. The aircraft will lose nose 
landing gear doors retraction 
function 
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased  
3.  No effect on occupants. 
Minor  
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Table B Landing gear extension/retraction control system FHA summary (cont.) 
 
Function 
Failure Condition 
(Hazard 
Description) 
Flight Phase Effect of Failure Condition on 1.Aircraft 2.Crew 3.Occupants Hazard Class 
Loss of left main 
landing gear doors 
extension 
Landing 
1. If the aircraft lose this function, 
it will result in the loss of left 
main landing gear doors 
extension function. 
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased significantly 
3.  Occupants might be injured 
Catastrophic 
Loss of left main 
landing gear doors 
extension 
Take off 1.The left main landing gear can not be retracted. Minor  
Loss of left main 
landing gear doors 
retraction 
Landing/Take 
off 
1. The aircraft will lose left main 
landing gear doors retraction 
function 
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased  
3.  No effect on occupants. 
Minor 
Loss of right main 
landing gear doors 
extension 
Landing 
1. If the aircraft lose this function, 
it will result in the loss of right 
main landing gear doors 
extension function. 
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased significantly 
3.  Occupants might be injured 
Catastrophic 
Control nose 
alanding gear doors 
and mainalanding 
gear doors 
extension/retraction 
 
Loss of right main 
landing gear doors 
extension 
Take off 1 The right main landing gear can not be retracted Minor  
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Table B Landing gear extension/retraction control system FHA summary (cont.) 
 
 
Function 
Failure Condition 
(Hazard 
Description) 
Flight Phase Effect of Failure Condition on 1.Aircraft 2.Crew 3.Occupants Hazard Class 
Control nose 
alanding gear doors 
and mainalanding 
gear doors 
extension/retraction 
 
Loss of right main 
landing gear doors 
retraction 
Landing/Take 
off 
1. The aircraft will lose right main 
landing gear doors retraction 
function 
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased  
3.  No effect on occupants. 
Minor 
Lose of nosealanding 
gear position 
indication 
Landing/Take 
off 
1. The aircraft will lose nose 
landing gear position indication 
function  
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased 
3.  No effect on occupants 
Minor 
Landing gear 
position indication 
and warning 
Lose of left main 
landing gear position 
indication 
Landing/Take 
off 
1. The aircraft will lose left main 
landing gear position indication 
function  
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased 
3.  No effect on occupants 
Minor 
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Table B Landing gear extension/retraction control system FHA summary (cont.) 
 
Function 
Failure Condition 
(Hazard 
Description) 
Flight Phase Effect of Failure Condition on 1.Aircraft 2.Crew 3.Occupants Hazard Class 
Lose of right main 
landing gear position 
indication 
Landing/Take 
off 
1. The aircraft will lose right main 
landing gear position indication 
function  
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased 
3.  No effect on occupants 
Minor 
Erroneous nose 
landing gear 
retraction position 
indication without 
warning 
Take off 
3. The aircraft will display 
inaccurate nose landing gear 
position   
4. Crew may be unable to 
recognize         invalid data 
display 
3.  No effect on occupants 
Minor 
Erroneous nose 
landing gear 
extension position 
indication without 
warning 
Landing 
1. The aircraft will display 
inaccurate nose landing gear 
position   
2. Crew may be unable to 
recognize invalid data display 
3.  Occupants might be injured 
Catastrophic 
Landing gear 
position indication 
and warning 
Erroneous left main 
landing gear 
retraction position 
indication without 
warning 
Take off 
1. The aircraft will display 
inaccurate left main landing gear 
position   
2. Crew may be unable to 
recognize         invalid data 
display 
3.  No effect on occupants 
Minor 
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Table B Landing gear extension/retraction control system FHA summary (cont.) 
 
 
Function 
Failure Condition 
(Hazard 
Description) 
Flight 
Phase 
Effect of Failure Condition on 
1.Aircraft 2.Crew 3.Occupants Hazard Class 
Erroneous left main 
landing gear 
extension position 
indication without 
warning 
Landing 
1. The aircraft will display 
inaccurate left main landing gear 
position   
2. Crew may be unable to 
recognize invalid data display 
3.  Occupants might be injured 
Catastrophic 
Erroneous right main 
landing gear 
retraction position 
indication without 
warning 
Take off 
1. The aircraft will display 
inaccurate right main landing 
gear position   
2. Crew may be unable to 
recognize         invalid data 
display 
3.  No effect on occupants 
Minor 
Erroneous right main 
landing gear 
extension position 
indication without 
warning 
Landing 
1. The aircraft will display 
inaccurate right main landing 
gear position   
2. Crew may be unable to 
recognize invalid data display 
3.  Occupants might be injured 
Catastrophic 
Landing gear 
position indication 
and warning 
Erroneous nose 
landing gear 
retraction position 
indication with 
warning 
Take off 
1. The aircraft will display 
inaccurate nose landing gear 
position   
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased 
3.  No effect on occupants 
Minor  
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Table B Landing gear extension/retraction control system FHA summary (cont.) 
 
 
Function 
Failure Condition 
(Hazard 
Description) 
Flight 
Phase 
Effect of Failure Condition on 
1.Aircraft 2.Crew 3.Occupants Hazard Class 
Erroneous nose 
landing gear 
extension position 
indication with 
warning 
Landing 
1. The aircraft will display 
inaccurate nose landing gear 
position   
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased 
3.  No effect on occupants 
Minor 
Erroneous left main 
landing gear 
retraction position 
indication with 
warning 
Take off 
1. The aircraft will display 
inaccurate left main landing gear 
position   
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased 
3.  No effect on occupants 
Minor 
Erroneous left main 
landing gear 
extension position 
indication with 
warning 
Landing 
1. The aircraft will display 
inaccurate left main landing gear 
position   
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased 
3.  No effect on occupants 
Minor 
Landing gear 
position indication 
and warning 
Erroneous right main 
landing gear 
retraction position 
indication with 
warning 
Take off 
1. The aircraft will display 
inaccurate right main landing 
gear position   
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased 
3.  No effect on occupants 
Minor 
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Table B Landing gear extension/retraction control system FHA summary (cont.) 
 
 
Function 
Failure Condition 
(Hazard 
Description) 
Flight Phase Effect of Failure Condition on 1.Aircraft 2.Crew 3.Occupants Hazard Class 
Landing gear 
position indication 
and warning 
Erroneous right main 
landing gear 
extension position 
indication with 
warning 
Landing 
1. The aircraft will display 
inaccurate right main landing 
gear position   
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased 
3.  No effect on occupants 
Minor 
System internal 
data exchange 
Loss of internal data 
exchange 
Landing/Take 
off 
1. signals will not be transmitted 
between the two LGCIU 
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased 
3. No effect on occupants 
Minor 
External data 
exchange 
Loss of external data 
exchange 
Landing/Take 
off 
1. signals will not be transmitted to 
other systems 
2. The work load of flight crew will 
increased 
3. No effect on occupants 
Minor  
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Appendix C  
Table C Landing Gear Extension/Retraction Control System FMEA Summary 
 
Item Failure mode Flight phase Local Effect Effect on the system Effect on aircraft
Severity 
Level 
Fails to switch to up 
position Take off 
Fails to switch to 
up position 
Loss of the normal 
landing gear retraction 
function 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
retraction function
Minor  
L/G Lever 
Fails to switch to down 
position Landing 
Fails to switch to 
down position 
Loss of the normal 
landing gear extension 
function 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension function
Minor  
Loss of the control of 
door selector valve 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Loss of the 
control of door 
selector valve 
Loss of the LGCIU1 
normal landing gear 
extension/retraction 
function  
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension 
/retraction 
function 
Minor  
Landing Gear 
Control  and 
Interface Unit 
1(LGCIU1) 
Loss of the control of 
gear selector valve 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Loss of the 
control of gear 
selector valve 
Loss of the LGCIU1 
normal landing gear 
extension/retraction 
function  
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension 
/retraction 
function 
Minor  
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Table C Landing Gear Extension/Retraction Control System FMEA Summary (cont.) 
 
Item Failure mode Flight phase Local Effect Effect on the system Effect on aircraft
Severity 
Level 
Loss of proximity 
sensors signal input 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Loss of 
proximity 
sensors signal 
input 
Loss of the LGCIU1 
proximity sensors 
signal output 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
proximity sensors 
signal input 
Minor  
Loss of proximity 
sensors signal output 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Loss of 
proximity 
sensors signal 
output 
Loss of the LGCIU1 
proximity sensors 
signal output 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
proximity sensors 
signal output 
Minor  
Loss of data from 
LGCIU2 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Loss of data 
from LGCIU2 
Loss of the 
communication 
between  LGCIU1 and 
LGCIU2 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension 
/retraction 
function 
Minor 
Landing Gear 
Control  and 
Interface Unit 
1(LGCIU1) 
Loss of data 
transferred to LGCIU2 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Loss of data 
transferred to 
LGCIU2 
Loss of the 
communication 
between  LGCIU1 and 
LGCIU2 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension 
/retraction 
function 
Minor 
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Table C Landing Gear Extension/Retraction Control System FMEA Summary (cont.) 
 
Item Failure mode Flight phase Local Effect Effect on the system Effect on aircraft
Severity 
Level 
Loss of data from L/G 
lever 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Loss of data 
from L/G lever 
Loss of the LGCIU1 
normal landing gear 
extension/retraction 
function 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension 
/retraction 
function 
Minor 
Landing Gear 
Control  and 
Interface Unit 
1(LGCIU1) 
Erroneous landing gear 
position data output 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Erroneous 
landing gear 
position data 
output 
Erroneous landing gear 
position data output 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
position data 
output 
Minor  
Loss of the control of 
door selector valve 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Loss of the 
control of door 
selector valve 
Loss of the LGCIU2 
normal landing gear 
extension/retraction 
function  
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension 
/retraction 
function 
Minor  
Landing Gear 
Control  and 
Interface Unit 
2(LGCIU2) 
Loss of the control of 
gear selector valve 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Loss of the 
control of gear 
selector valve 
Loss of the LGCIU2 
normal landing gear 
extension/retraction 
function  
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension 
/retraction 
function 
Minor  
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Table C Landing Gear Extension/Retraction Control System FMEA Summary (cont.) 
 
Item Failure mode Flight phase Local Effect Effect on the system Effect on aircraft
Severity 
Level 
Loss of proximity 
sensors signal input 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Loss of 
proximity 
sensors signal 
input 
Loss of the LGCIU2 
proximity sensors 
signal output 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
proximity sensors 
signal input 
Minor  
Loss of proximity 
sensors signal output 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Loss of 
proximity 
sensors signal 
output 
Loss of the LGCIU2 
proximity sensors 
signal output 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
proximity sensors 
signal output 
Minor  
Loss of data from 
LGCIU1 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Loss of data 
from LGCIU1 
Loss of the 
communication 
between  LGCIU1 and 
LGCIU2 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension 
/retraction 
function 
Minor 
Landing Gear 
Control  and 
Interface Unit 
2(LGCIU2) 
Loss of data 
transferred to LGCIU1 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Loss of data 
transferred to 
LGCIU1 
Loss of the 
communication 
between  LGCIU1 and 
LGCIU2 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension 
/retraction 
function 
Minor 
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Table C Landing Gear Extension/Retraction Control System FMEA Summary (cont.) 
 
Item Failure mode Flight phase Local Effect Effect on the system Effect on aircraft
Severity 
Level 
Loss of data from L/G 
lever 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Loss of data 
from L/G lever 
Loss of the LGCIU2 
normal landing gear 
extension/retraction 
function 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension 
/retraction 
function 
Minor 
Landing Gear 
Control  and 
Interface Unit 
2(LGCIU2) 
Erroneous landing gear 
position data output 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Erroneous 
landing gear 
position data 
output 
Erroneous landing gear 
position data output 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
position data 
output 
Minor  
Fails to switch to 
extension position 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Fails to switch to 
extension 
position 
Loss of the normal 
landing gear door 
extension function 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension function
Minor  
Door selector 
valve 
Internal leakage Landing/ Take off Internal leakage
Loss of the normal 
landing gear door 
extension function 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension function
Minor  
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Table C Landing Gear Extension/Retraction Control System FMEA Summary (cont.) 
 
 
 
Item Failure mode Flight phase Local Effect 
Effect on the 
system Effect on aircraft 
Severity 
Level 
Fails to switch to 
retraction position 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Fails to switch to 
retraction 
position 
Loss of the landing 
gear door retraction 
function 
Landing gear doors 
remain open Minor  
Selector valve always 
at extension position 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Selector valve 
always at 
extension 
position 
Loss of the landing 
gear door retraction 
function 
Landing gear doors 
remain open Minor  
Selector valve always 
at retraction position 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Selector valve 
always at 
retraction 
position 
Loss of the normal 
landing gear door 
extension function 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension function 
Minor  
Loss the control 
of actuators 
Loss of the normal 
landing gear door 
extension function 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension function 
Minor  
Door selector 
valve 
Loss the control of 
actuators 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Loss the control 
of actuators 
Loss of the normal 
landing gear door 
retraction function 
Landing gear doors 
remain open Minor 
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Table C Landing Gear Extension/Retraction Control System FMEA Summary (cont.) 
 
Item Failure mode Flight phase Local Effect Effect on the system Effect on aircraft
Severity 
Level 
Internal leakage Landing/ Take off Internal leakage
Loss of the normal 
landing gear door 
extension function 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension function
Minor 
Fails to switch to 
extension position 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Fails to switch to 
extension 
position 
Loss of the normal 
landing gear door 
extension function 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension function
Minor  
Fails to switch to 
retraction position 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Fails to switch to 
retraction 
position 
Loss of the landing 
gear retraction function
Landing gears 
remain at 
extension position
Minor  
Gear selector 
valve 
Selector valve always 
at extension position 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Selector valve 
always at 
extension 
position 
Loss of the landing 
gear retraction function
Landing gears 
remain at 
extension position
Minor  
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Table C Landing Gear Extension/Retraction Control System FMEA Summary (cont.) 
 
Item Failure mode Flight phase Local Effect Effect on the system Effect on aircraft
Severity 
Level 
Selector valve always 
at retraction position 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Selector valve 
always at 
retraction 
position 
Loss of the normal 
landing gear extension 
function 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension function
Minor  
Loss the control 
of actuators 
Loss of the normal 
landing gear extension 
function 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension function
Minor  Gear selector valve 
Loss the control of 
actuators 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Loss the control 
of actuators 
Loss of the normal 
landing gear retraction 
function 
Landing gears 
remain at 
extension position
Minor 
Proximity 
sensor 
Always indicates 
proximate position  
Landing/ 
Take off 
Always 
indicates 
proximate 
position  
Fault indication  
of landing gear position 
indication 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
position indication
Minor  
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Table C Landing Gear Extension/Retraction Control System FMEA Summary (cont.) 
 
Item Failure mode Flight phase Local Effect Effect on the system Effect on aircraft
Severity 
Level 
Proximity 
sensor 
Always indicates 
removed position  
Landing/ 
Take off 
Always 
indicates  
removed 
position  
Fault indication  
of landing gear position 
indication 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
position indication
Minor  
Gravity 
extension 
switch 
Fails to switch to down 
position 
Landing/ 
Take off 
Fails to switch to 
down position 
Reduce the 
redundancy of gravity 
extension function 
None  Minor  
Open circuit Landing/ Take off Open circuit Motor out of work 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
gravity extension 
function 
Minor  
Gravity 
extension  
motor 
Short circuit Landing/ Take off Short circuit 
Loss of gravity 
extension function 
Reduce the 
redundancy of 
landing gear 
extension function
Minor  
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Appendix D: Summary of FTA  
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 127
Erroneous nose landing gear extension position indication without 
warning
Warning system 
fault
Loss of normal nose landing gear extension function
LGCIU fault Gear selector valve faultL/G Lever fails to switch to 
down position
LGCIU2 faultLGCIU1 fault
Loss of data 
from L/G lever
Loss the control 
of gear selector 
valve
Loss of data 
from L/G lever
Fails to switch 
to extension 
position
Selector valve 
always at 
retraction 
position
Loss the control 
of gear selector 
valve
Loss of warning function
Erroneous landing 
gear position data 
output
LGCU1 erroneous 
landing gear 
position data output
LGCU2 erroneous 
landing gear 
position data output
Proximity 
sensor fault 
LGCU1 fault 
output
Proximity 
sensor fault 
LGCU2 fault 
output
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Lose of left main landing gear extension
Loss of normal left main landing gear extension function Loss of left main landing gear gravity extension
LGCIU fault Gear selector valve faultL/G Lever fails to switch to 
down position
LGCIU2 faultLGCIU1 fault
Loss the control 
of gear selector 
valve
Loss of data 
from L/G lever
Loss the control 
of gear selector 
valve
Loss of data 
from L/G lever
Fails to switch 
to extension 
position
Selector valve 
always at 
retraction 
position
Gravity extension 
subsystem 1
Gravity extension 
subsystem 2
Unlock motor 1 
fault
Gravity 
extension 
switch 1 fault
Unlock motor 2 
fault
Gravity 
extension 
switch 2 fault
 
 129
Loss of right main landing gear extension
Loss of normal  right main  landing gear extension function Loss of  right main landing gear gravity extension
LGCIU fault Gear selector valve faultL/G Lever fails to switch to 
down position
LGCIU2 faultLGCIU1 fault
Loss the control 
of gear selector 
valve
Loss of data 
from L/G lever
Loss the control 
of gear selector 
valve
Loss of data 
from L/G lever
Fails to switch 
to extension 
position
Selector valve 
always at 
retraction 
position
Gravity extension 
subsystem 1
Gravity extension 
subsystem 2
Unlock motor 1 
fault
Gravity 
extension 
switch 1 fault
Unlock motor 2 
fault
Gravity 
extension 
switch 2 fault
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 132
Erroneous left main landing gear extension position indication 
without warning
Warning system 
fault
Loss of normal left main landing gear extension function
LGCIU fault Gear selector valve faultL/G Lever fails to switch to 
down position
LGCIU2 faultLGCIU1 fault
Loss of data 
from L/G lever
Loss the control 
of gear selector 
valve
Loss of data 
from L/G lever
Fails to switch 
to extension 
position
Selector valve 
always at 
retraction 
position
Loss the control 
of gear selector 
valve
Loss of warning function
Erroneous landing 
gear position data 
output
LGCU1 erroneous 
landing gear 
position data output
LGCU2 erroneous 
landing gear 
position data output
Proximity 
sensor fault 
LGCU1 fault 
output
Proximity 
sensor fault 
LGCU2 fault 
output
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Erroneous right main landing gear extension position indication 
without warning
Warning system 
fault
Loss of normal right main landing gear extension function
LGCIU fault Gear selector valve faultL/G Lever fails to switch to 
down position
LGCIU2 faultLGCIU1 fault
Loss of data 
from L/G lever
Loss the control 
of gear selector 
valve
Loss of data 
from L/G lever
Fails to switch 
to extension 
position
Selector valve 
always at 
retraction 
position
Loss the control 
of gear selector 
valve
Loss of warning function
Erroneous landing 
gear position data 
output
LGCU1 erroneous 
landing gear 
position data output
LGCU2 erroneous 
landing gear 
position data output
Proximity 
sensor fault 
LGCU1 fault 
output
Proximity 
sensor fault 
LGCU2 fault 
output
 
